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ABSTRACT
In keeping with a long history of striving to preserve its traditional settlement pattern and promote smart
growth, Vermont's most recent growth management policies encourage municipalities to plan for and
accommodate development in dense, mixed-use growth centers. However, concentrating development in
this manner requires a level of wastewater treatment capacity that is absent in a majority of Vermont
municipalities and in nearly half of Vermont's existing designated village centers. It is certainly true that
wastewater treatment capacity is neither the only nor the most critical barrier to implementing the growth
center concept in Vermont. Nonetheless, it is an obstacle that Vermont must address if it wishes to see its
smart growth goals fulfilled statewide, including in unsewered towns that are experiencing development
pressure and need to increase their wastewater treatment capacity to accommodate such development in
their growth centers.
The State is currently developing a publication and trainings to educate local decision-makers about
wastewater treatment problems and the range of possible conventional and alternative solutions. This
outreach effort will definitely help unsewered towns to better understand their wastewater treatment needs
and to find the most innovative and economical wastewater management solutions for their given situation.
However, sufficiently addressing the wastewater barrier to smart growth in Vermont also necessitates
tackling some of the difficulties inherent in financing these types of projects. Therefore, this thesis has
attempted to spark a discussion in Vermont about the financing side of this planning dilemma by providing
its readers with a better understanding of the funding realities of small community wastewater projects, as
well as the revenue-generating mechanism known as tax increment financing (TIF), which has been
proposed in Vermont as one way to help towns fund their growth center wastewater infrastructure projects.
The research from this thesis indicates that although using TIF is plausible in theory in this context,
employing TIF seems to be neither practical nor suitable for growth center wastewater projects in
unsewered towns. However, the TIF concept can still be applied at the local level for these types of
projects using routine municipal tax revenue. In addition, this thesis suggests several ways the State can
assist unsewered municipalities in addressing the challenges they face in financing their growth center
wastewater projects.
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Background and Motivation for Research
Although government staff and officials, as well as the public at large, have been discussing issues
pertaining to the current state of wastewater management in many small Vermont communities for over a
decade, the conversation seems to have intensified in recent years. A contributing factor likely includes
growing public awareness of the environmental and public health hazards associated with poorly managed
wastewater. However, another key factor relates to the relationship between wastewater treatment
capacity and smart growth, a topic that I explore in depth in this thesis.
Interestingly, most of the literature dedicated to the topic of this relationship focuses on the tendency of
wastewater infrastructure to enable sprawl. However, in many small Vermont towns, it is actually a lack of
public wastewater infrastructure that has contributed to the emergence of sprawling development patterns.
In fact, in a majority of towns in Vermont, private, onsite wastewater systems, such as septic tanks and
leach fields, are used to collect, treat, and disperse household and commercial wastewater. Onsite
systems are very common across the United States, especially in rural locations, as they are a very cost-
effective way to handle wastewater in relatively low-density areas. However, these systems rely on soil to
treat and discharge wastewater and thus generally require large lots and low-density development to
function properly. Higher-capacity alternatives, including clustered systems or public sewers, on the other
hand, discharge treated wastewater into bodies of water or large leach fields. Thus, these higher-capacity
systems can better accommodate high-density development and more intensive land uses, including
industrial or commercial facilities. Therefore, towns in Vermont that have and continue to experience
development pressure but are unsewered struggle to implement a state goal of concentrating new
development in compact, high-density areas, known as growth centers.
Even though Vermont is a predominantly rural state and does not have the same development pressures
as other states in New England like Massachusetts, it is considered to be one of the pioneers of statewide
growth management policies and smart growth. In fact, since the 1960s, the State has pursued several
strategies to protect the environment and unique aesthetic of the state in the face of population growth and
economic development. Indeed, the State's principle land use goal seeks to maintain the historic
settlement pattern exemplified throughout the state of compact village and urban centers separated by rural
countryside, and programs and incentives are used to encourage new development in dense, mixed-use
areas referred to as growth centers. As mentioned above, the realization of this goal in Vermont's
unsewered towns is constrained by a lack of high-capacity wastewater treatment systems.
While at one time the federal government provided considerable grant funds for communities across the
United States to build wastewater infrastructure, as with many federal programs, those days are long gone.
Although there are some federal and state grant programs that can help pay for wastewater projects, they
are limited, dwindling, and highly competitive. Indeed, the ability of a town to obtain considerable grant
funds seems to make or break a wastewater projects in an unsewered Vermont town because small, rural
towns, which tend to have limited tax bases and substantial low-income populations, find repaying even
subsidized loans quite difficult. Therefore, if Vermont wants to see its smart growth goals implemented
statewide, it must address the funding realities unsewered towns face in improving their wastewater
treatment capacity to enable growth center development.
It seems as if the best way to address the financing barrier to growth center wastewater projects in
unsewered Vermont towns is to tackle the problem from two angles -by finding ways to reduce project
costs and exploring methods for filling the funding gap on these types of projects. However, at this point in
time it appears that the State is focusing solely on the former. In fact, in fall 2006 the Vermont Department
of Housing and Community Affairs (DHCA) received a grant from the EPA New England's Healthy
Communities Grant Program to help towns find the most cost-effective solutions to their wastewater
problems. The Department, along with its partners, is currently in the process of developing a publication
and trainings to educate busy municipal decision-makers about wastewater treatment problems, the range
of possible conventional and alternative solutions, and existing financing opportunities. This outreach effort
is most certainly laudable as it will assist unsewered towns in selecting the most innovative and economical
wastewater management solutions, given their existing contamination problems and desired new growth.
However, while this effort represents an important first step, it does not sufficiently address the obstacles
unsewered towns face in improving their wastewater treatment capacity to enable smart growth.
While working for the Planning Division in Vermont's DHCA during summer 2006, I became exposed to the
wastewater challenge Vermont is facing in implementing its smart growth goals. That summer, a fellow
intern and I began to conduct some very basic research on this topic, including alternative wastewater
management options, for the Department. However, in speaking with planners, engineers, state
environmental conservation staff, and local decision-makers, it became clear that trying to help more towns
implement growth center wastewater projects by approaching the problem from the cost side alone would
not be adequate. First, there are many towns in Vermont where difficult physical constraints simply prevent
construction of any combination of potentially less costly innovative or alternative solutions to a public
sewer system. Second, whether a town is able to find a relatively less expensive solution to meet its
needs, the fact remains that almost any solution represents a major financial investment for a small
Vermont town. Since my internship ended before I could explore the wastewater barrier to smart growth in
Vermont in more detail, I decided to focus my thesis research on this planning dilemma. In addition, I
wanted to concentrate my work on the funding side of growth center wastewater projects as it did not seem
that the State was focusing its efforts on this aspect of the problem.
Research Approach
As mentioned above, my thesis topic grew out of the research on wastewater management a fellow intern
and I began while working for Vermont's DHCA during summer 2006. A document we prepared for our
supervisor synthesizing our research to date thus provided me with preliminary contacts and a starting
point for initiating my research for this thesis. From my work during that summer and prior coursework, I
had a basic understanding of the issues I would explore in this thesis, and so my research served to
expand that knowledge through readings, interviews, and data analysis, much of which is referenced in the
bibliography and appendices to this thesis. I began by reviewing the literature related to these topics, as
well as examining federal, state, and municipal laws, planning documents, manuals, studies, and reports.
In addition, I interviewed a range of individuals, including staff at municipal, regional, state, and federal
public and quasi-public agencies, non-profit staff, engineers, listers, developers, and consultants, with most
interviews being conducted by phone or in some instances in person or via email. Finally, I collected and
analyzed tax, property value, housing, demographic, and project cost and revenue data obtained from state
and local sources, both in hard copy and online.
At first, I thought about studying the existing financing mechanisms small communities across the country
utilize for their wastewater projects to see if there would be any lessons for Vermont. However, very
preliminary research indicated that small, rural unsewered communities throughout the United States
essentially all use a similar mix of grants and below-market loans to pay for their wastewater projects,
making use of a combination of taxes and fees to repay project debt. In addition, while there are certainly
some ways Vermont can improve access to grants and subsidized loans for unswered towns constructing
new wastewater infrastructure for their growth centers, my early research suggested that capital availability
is not as much of an issue as finding affordable and agreeable methods for repaying project debt,
especially if limited grant funds result in shifting a significant portion of project costs onto local governments
and their residents. Therefore, I decided to expand my thesis research to include studying a revenue-
generating mechanism that the Vermont legislature had recently debated during its 2005-2006 session, tax-
increment financing (TIF), and to determine if it might be a viable funding source for growth center
wastewater projects in unsewered towns.
Tax-increment financing, which was developed in California in the 1950s, has been enabled by Vermont
statute since 1985. In general, TIF laws allow town officials to designate a geographical area within their
community as a TIF district. Once the district boundary is established and the town receives approval for
creating it, property taxes generated within the district are frozen at the current level for the life of the
district. This base level of taxes continues to be allocated as it always has, but any additional taxes that
are collected above that base level due to market appreciation, improvements to existing properties, and
new development, are set aside. This incremental tax revenue is then used to repay debt obtained to cover
the local share of a major investment in the district, such as a wastewater project. Once the debt has been
retired, all tax revenue from the district is allocated to the original taxing authorities. While this financing
tool has been employed extensively in several states across the country, it has been little used in Vermont
to date, due in part to the statutory restrictions imposed on TIF districts there. However, Vermont has
recently been working to make TIF easier to use by more communities. In fact, concurrent with their
support of Vermont's most recent smart growth legislation in 2006, stakeholders such as the Vermont
Forum on Sprawl advocated for companion legislation to improve access to TIF specifically for growth
center infrastructure projects. By broadening the approval criteria and extending the time limit of a TIF
district, it was hoped that more towns contemplating infrastructure projects in their growth centers would be
able to access this funding mechanism. However, as the literature on TIF indicates, it is certainly not
suitable for all communities. Indeed, aspects of Vermont's property tax policies and TIF regulations, in
addition to complications inherent in the use this financing tool itself may result in TIF not being an
appropriate or practical option for new wastewater infrastructure in unsewered towns. Therefore, this thesis
attempts shed some light on the utility of this financing mechanism in the context of Vermont growth center
wastewater projects.
As it often helps a reader to better understand a concept when discussed within a particular context, I
decided that it would be useful to include a discussion of a particular Vermont growth center wastewater
project in a previously unsewered town for which TIF has been used or might be an option. However,
because the new version of the TIF program in Vermont is in its infancy, selecting an appropriate case
study proved somewhat difficult. However, conversations with staff at the Vermont Forum on Sprawl,
Vermont Economic Progress Council, and Vermont Downtown Program led me to believe that the
wastewater project in Waitsfield, Vermont would be the best candidate for such a case study. As gleaned
from these interviews, Waitsfield seemed to be a good option for highlighting issues pertaining to smart
growth, wastewater infrastructure financing, and TIF for a number of reasons, including the long history of
its wastewater project, its commitment to implementing the growth center concept, its development
potential given its position as both a tourist destination and regional employment center, and its resulting
interest in examining the feasibility of using TIF for its wastewater project. In the end, however, while
interviews with local stakeholders, field research, and data analysis formed the basis of the case study,
several timing and data collection matters constrained its efficacy as an example of how TIF could be used
to partially finance a growth center wastewater project.
Thesis Objectives
As DHCA attests in the purpose statement for its wastewater management publications and trainings, busy
local decision-makers are often overwhelmed by the myriad of choices they must make regarding a
wastewater project, often relying heavily on their hired consultants to guide them through the process. In
addition, government staff and public officials often do not have the time or objectivity to fully explore all
aspects of a problem in designing solutions. However, by educating these policy makers and decision-
makers on key issues that affect many communities in Vermont, they are likely to make more informed
decisions that affect the future of the state. Therefore, this thesis attempts to provide its readers with a
better understanding of the funding realities of small community wastewater projects, as well as the viability
of using TIF to help pay for growth center wastewater projects in unsewered towns and what conditions or
resources are needed to do so. It is my hope that the information contained in this thesis will help DHCA in
its efforts to facilitate finding appropriate and effective solutions for addressing a significant barrier that
unsewered Vermont towns face in implementing state smart growth goals.
The following two chapters introduce the reader to the planning dilemma the thesis addresses -that
wastewater treatment capacity is a barrier to smart growth in Vermont and that financing wastewater
infrastructure projects that attempt to resolve this problem is constrained by the funding realities that small,
rural communities face. Chapter two begins with a brief summary of the concepts of sprawl and smart
growth to establish why growth management policies are advantageous to society. The chapter continues
with a description of how Vermont has addressed the issues of sprawl and promoted smart growth in the
last forty years. At the end of the chapter, the wastewater barrier to smart growth in Vermont is discussed,
including how this problem might be resolved and what may prevent the implementation of such solutions.
Chapter three builds upon this section by exploring how funding limitations restrict the ability of unsewered
towns to address their wastewater barrier to smart growth. The chapter starts with a historical and national
overview of wastewater infrastructure funding and then moves onto Vermont's financial assistance
programs. The chapter also includes a description of other federal, state, and local funding options, as well
as a look at how recent projects in previously unsewered Vermont towns have been funded. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of some of the financing challenges specific to small communities and
suggestions for how Vermont might ease the financing process for its unsewered towns.
In the next two chapters, the potential for using TIF as a revenue-generating mechanism for growth center
wastewater projects is examined. In the fourth chapter, an overview of TIF, including its history, how it
functions, and how it tends to be used, familiarizes the reader with this municipal financing tool in general.
The subsequent discussion of Vermont's TIF enabling legislation, the TIF district creation process in
Vermont, and the way TIF has been used in the state to date introduces the reader to the particular
nuances of using TIF in Vermont. The chapter ends with an explanation of the benefits and drawbacks of
using TIF in the context of a growth center wastewater project, including why it may or may not be a
reasonable option, the conditions under which it is most feasible, the magnitude of property value growth
towns would have to see in their growth centers to generate sufficient increments to cover the local share of
project costs, and what towns can do to improve the possibility of generating such increments. The fifth
chapter serves to deepen the TIF analysis by looking at a specific case - the wastewater project in
Waitsfield. While the project in Waitsfield may be unique in many ways, the case study should give the
reader an example of the type of analysis that supports a decision to create a TIF district, as well as
lessons that can be applied elsewhere. Finally, the thesis closes with a summary of my conclusions from
conducting this research and recommendations for further action by the State.
Chapter 2
THE WASTEWATER BARRIER TO SMART GROWTH IN VERMONT
The terms 'smart growth,' 'new urbanism,' 'transit-oriented development,' and 'neo-traditional development'
are ubiquitous in the planning field today. As approaches to planning and development that are designed
to combat sprawl and promote compact, mixed-use neighborhoods, walkable communities, easy access to
alternative modes of transportation, and open space preservation, they have been embraced by many as
the best way to manage growth in this country. While this belief is certainly debatable - indeed, all of the
concepts listed above have their critics - smart growth certainly seems to be a growing trend in planning.
The State of Vermont, for its part, has been promoting some form of smart growth for nearly forty years. In
fact, the State's primary land use goal is to "plan development so as to maintain the historic settlement
pattern of compact village and urban centers separated by rural countryside" (Vermont). While many state
and local policies and programs encourage new growth and redevelopment in Vermont's growth centers',
barriers to smart growth continue to impede Vermont communities from implementing this goal. One such
barrier yet to be fully addressed by the State is insufficient wastewater treatment capacity to accommodate
the densities and uses inherent in advancing smart growth, an issue explored in this chapter. The chapter
begins with a brief summary of the concepts of sprawl and smart growth, then details how Vermont has
addressed the issues of sprawl and promoted smart growth, and finally describes why wastewater
treatment capacity is a barrier to achieving smart growth in Vermont.
Sprawl and Smart Growth
In the forward to Solving Sprawl: Models of Smart Growth in Communities Across America, former
Maryland Governor Parris Glendening suggests that since World War II, moving up the social and
economic ladder has been synonymous with moving out of cities and into the suburbs (Benfield et al. viii).
The Interstate Highway Act and the Federal Housing Administration's mortgage financing program2 are
considered by many to have played an instrumental role in inducing this movement of households from
central cities into new housing developments in areas that were once predominantly farmland or forests.
I This term will be explained in more detail later in the chapter, but 'growth centers' essentially refer to downtowns, village
centers, or other designated areas of a community that can accommodate a significant amount of the growth anticipated over a
20-year period.
2 The Federal-Aid Highway Act appropriated funds for the construction of thousands of miles of interstate highways while the
Federal Housing Administration's mortgage financing program has traditionally insured mortgage loans in areas dominated by
low-density development.
However, the housing, commercial, and industrial development that emerged in the 1950s and continues
today has also been influenced by federal environmental regulations and tax laws, as well as local and
state policies and initiatives, including school funding and siting priorities, zoning regulations, and
infrastructure investments (Smart Growth). Unfortunately, like Glendening, many argue that these
development patterns have played a dominant role in "destroying our cherished landscapes" and have
contributed to the phenomenon know as sprawl (Benfield et al. viii).
Sprawl is often characterized by a separation of land uses, low-density and leap-frog development3, and
car dependency. This type of development has not only led to a loss in aesthetic appeal and
distinctiveness in the built environment but has also been instrumental in creating increased traffic
congestion and commute times, health problems, fiscal constraints, and environmental degradation. By the
1970s, urban, suburban, and rural communities across the country began to recognize the link between
these problems and the development patterns that were causing them, and states initiated distinct growth
management solutions based on their "own values, traditions, and geography" (Benfield et al. ix). As John
DeGrove describes in his most recent book on smart growth, the '"irst wave" of growth management states
surfaced in the 1970s, and their policies ranged from rather strong, comprehensive ones in Oregon and
Hawaii to more geographically or project-limited policies in Vermont, Florida, Colorado, California, and
North Carolina (3). In the 1980s and 1990s, growth management practices then evolved from having a no
growth or slow growth posture to one of planning for growth "so as to achieve a responsible balance
between the protection of natural systems...and the development required to support growth in the
residential, commercial and retail areas" (DeGrove 4). Today, growth management policies promoting
smart growth, new urbanism, sustainable development, and transit-oriented development are based on the
premise that growth is inevitable and has many benefits but should not occur haphazardly (DeGrove 5 and
Benfield et al. ix). As such, smart growth is an approach to development that attempts to ensure that
growth occurs in a place and manner that is most compatible with a vibrant and healthy society (Benfield et
al. ix).
As one might imagine, the term 'smart growth' is difficult to define precisely as it means numerous things to
different interest groups. However, the Smart Growth Network has published ten generally accepted
principles of smart growth that, when applied in combination, should lead to the creation of non-sprawling
3 To access less expensive land, developers will often bypasses concentrated development areas already served by public
facilities and services, thereby leading to leap-frog development.
communities4. Gerrit Knapp, Director of the National Center for Smart Growth Research and Education,
describes five objectives that smart growth principles seek to achieve, including preservation of farmland or
open space, environmental protection, reducing infrastructure costs, promoting human health, and
furthering social equity (3). As he points out, by containing growth, encouraging infill development, and
increasing the density of the built environment, prime agricultural land, forests, and open space can be
conserved for more natural habitats (Knapp 3-13). Similarly, higher density, mixed-use developments that
are less automobile dependent are likely to lead to improved air and water quality, encourage physical
activity, and increase traffic and pedestrian safety. Government agencies are well-aware of these benefits
and have developed strategies to advance the concept of smart growth, including forming regional planning
agencies, requiring comprehensive land use plans and environmental impact assessments, tying public
funding to investments that reduce sprawl, and creating zoning regulations that allow for mixed-use
development, mixed-income housing, less surface parking, and higher densities.
Sprawl and Smart Growth in the Vermont Context
In the 1960s, the construction of Interstates 89 and 91 in Vermont connected the area with New York and
Boston, fueling economic development throughout the state. At the same time, Vermont's undeveloped
countryside became more accessible for flatlanders5 both looking to visit the area and seeking a better
quality of life year-round. However, while growth in the manufacturing, tourism, and second home
development sectors has improved the economy of the state, it has also contributed to low-density
development along the highways and in the rural countryside. Thus, as with other New England states,
even in predominantly rural areas, Vermont has not been immune to sprawl. In fact, a citizen planner's
guidebook published in 2002 by the Conservation Law Foundation and the Vermont Forum on Sprawl
states that "sprawl has been the dominant trend in land use over the last half century in New England"
(Heart et al. 3). Included in this publication are several alarming indicators of sprawl in Vermont alone:
* In the last fifty years, 88% of population growth has occurred in new-growth areas and outlying
towns;
4 These principles are: "1. Create a range of housing opportunities and choices, 2. Create walkable neighborhoods, 3. Encourage
community and stakeholder collaboration, 4. Foster distinctive, attractive communities with a strong sense of place, 5. Make
development decisions predictable, fair, and cost effective, 6. Mix land uses, 7. Preserve open space, farmland, natural beauty,
and critical environmental areas, 8. Provide a variety of transportation choices, 9. Strengthen and direct development towards
existing communities, 10. Take advantage of compact building design" (About Smart Growth).
5 This term refers to people from geographical areas that are predominantly flat and is used by native Vermonters to refer to
those who move to or visit Vermont from Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, or New Jersey.
* In the last thirty years, annual vehicle miles traveled have more than doubled while the population
has only grown by 33%; and
* In the last twenty years, land has been developed at a rate more than 10% greater than the rate of
population growth. (Heart et al. 4)
Nonetheless, Vermont's quality of life and relatively pristine environment has been and continues to be one
of the area's greatest assets, captivating tourists and permanent residents alike. To preserve these
attractive characteristics and to mitigate the problems associated with sprawl and haphazard growth
patterns, Vermont has embraced many growth management strategies over the years in an effort to
encourage "planned and controlled growth within the context of the traditional Vermont settlement pattem"
(Growth Centers 4).
Although primarily a rural state, Vermont's unique smart growth strategies have been at the national
forefront for more than forty years. In the 1960's, along with the surge in population growth and economic
development, Vermonters became concerned with environmental protection and growth management.
Worried about the impact of this growth, including the strain it would put on municipal services and the
likelihood of increased property taxes, the governor and legislature initiated councils and commissions to
study potential growth management strategies. By 1967, the legislature enacted Chapter 117, the
Municipal and Regional Planning and Development Act which, in addition to permitting the establishment of
municipal and regional planning commissions, listed the purposes that planning and zoning should achieve,
content of municipal plans, and process for adoption. Further growth management progress was made in
1969, when the Commission on Environmental Control proposed Act 250, Vermont's Land Use and
Development Law. This law, passed in 1970, enabled "regulatory review by the state for major
developments" and outlined the ten criteria to be used by citizen district environmental commissions in nine
regions of the state to review large development or subdivision proposals (Cloud and Monaghan 3). The
criteria were designed in an attempt to encourage compact growth and included "the impact on the growth
of the town or region, the costs of scattered development, and development involving public investments"
(Growth Centers 21).
In his most recent publication on growth management, Planning Policy and Politics: Smart Growth and the
States, John DeGrove begins the section on New England by commenting that, "in 1970, Vermont adopted
Act 250, a regulatory system for managing its growth, in what was a remarkable step in a conservative New
England state" (131). DeGrove asserts that Act 250 never evolved into the comprehensive planning and
regulatory system it was envisioned to be (131). However, as he points out, "no other New England state
managed to adopt any comprehensive public sector growth strategy until 1988," despite the fact that the
negative impact of unmanaged growth had been very real long before then (131). DeGrove also maintains
that, even with fluctuations in support and opposition over the decades, Vermont, along with Rhode Island
and Maine, have managed to move beyond the influences of weakening or destroying their growth
management goals 'to take proactive efforts to implement the original objectives of those systems" (131).
Since Act 250 did not end up creating a comprehensive planning system, Vermont was in need of a system
that could tackle some of the issues emerging by the 1980s as the actions of individual towns were having
more and more of a regional impact. In 1988, the Kunin administration created the Commission on
Vermont's Future, whose efforts led to the passage of Act 200, which significantly amended the Municipal
and Regional Planning and Development Act of 1967. This amendment established mechanisms for
ensuring increased coordination and compatibility among town, regional, and state plans, and provided a
funding source, the Property Transfer Tax6, to assist municipalities in their planning efforts. In addition, and
perhaps most importantly, the law required that all local, regional, and state planning efforts comply with the
land use goals stated in the statute, including the principal land use goal of "plan[ing] development so as to
maintain the historic settlement pattern of compact village and urban centers separated by rural
countryside" (Vermont).
In an effort to perpetuate this traditional settlement pattern and encourage smart growth, Vermont has been
developing and refining the concept of 'growth centers' for almost the last two decades. Throughout the
1990s, the Vermont Planners Association (VPA), the Vermont Natural Resource Council, the legislature,
and other agencies discussed the concept and drafted several definitions for growth centers. From 1993 -
1995, the Vermont Department of Housing and Community Affairs (DHCA) piloted a project to 'test
planning techniques and the resources needed for towns to plan growth centers," and in 1996 the VPA
formed a committee to explore the growth center concept, producing a report in 1999, entitled "Growth
Centers in Vermont: A Vermont Solution to Sprawl," which outlined the committee's conclusions (Growth
Centers 22). In this report, the committee indicates that a growth center is "a planning concept that refers
to one or more areas of a community as designated by that municipality...to accommodate a significant
6 The property transfer tax in Vermont is a tax levied on property buyers when a deed shows that title has been transferred.
amount of the growth anticipated by the municipality over the coming twenty years" (Growth Centers 6).
This concept has evolved to be defined as a geographical area located in or adjacent to a designated
downtown, village center, or new town center7 containing a substantial number of the following
characteristics identified in Vermont statute:
1. It incorporates a mix of uses that typically include or have the potential to include the following:
retail, office, services, and other commercial, civic, recreational, industrial, and residential
uses, including affordable housing and new residential neighborhoods, within a densely
developed, compact area;
2. It incorporates existing or planned public spaces that promote social interaction, such as public
parks, civic buildings (e.g., post office, municipal offices), community gardens, and other
formal and informal places to gather.
3. It is organized around one or more central places or focal points, such as prominent buildings
of civic, cultural, or spiritual significance or a village green, common, or square.
4. It promotes densities of land development that are significantly greater than existing and
allowable densities in parts of the municipality that are outside a designated downtown, village
center, growth center, or new town center, or, in the case of municipalities characterized
predominately by areas of existing dense urban settlement, it encourages in-fill development
and redevelopment of historically developed land.
5. It is supported by existing or planned investments in infrastructure and encompasses a
circulation system that is conducive to pedestrian and other non-vehicular traffic and that
incorporates, accommodates, and supports the use of public transit systems.
6. It results in compact concentrated areas of land development that are served by existing or
planned infrastructure and are separated by rural countryside or working landscape. (Vermont)
As with most smart growth initiatives, the concept of growth centers revolves around the assumption that by
managing and directing new development into designated high-density areas of a community that it will
improve the health of residents and the environment, among other benefits. Over the years, Vermont has
endeavored to create several financial and technical assistance programs, policies, and incentives to
encourage development in designated growth areas.8 Most notable is the Vermont Downtown Program,
which was established in 1998 and is affiliated with the National Trust Main Street Center9. In fact, this
program has succeeded in bringing about significant restoration and revitalization in over twenty designated
downtowns and over seventy village centers, and has broadened its mandate to include fostering
development in new town centers and growth centers, as well. However, sprawl continues to plague
Vermont. As a matter of fact, in 2003, the Vermont Smart Growth Collaborative (VSGC) published a report
7 For an explanation of the conceptual differences between downtowns, village centers, new town centers, and growth centers,
please refer to a DHCA document available at http:llwww.dhca.state.vt.us/Planning/ConceptualDifference DTvsGC.doc or pp. 5-
7 of the Growth Center Planning Manual at http://www.dhca.state.vt.us/Plannina/GCManualPartl.pdf.
8 See Appendix A for a list of Vermonts smart growth policies and programs.
9 The National Trust Main Street Center is a program of the National Trust for Historic Preservation that aims to combine historic
preservation with grassroots-based economic development to revitalize downtowns and commercial districts.
evaluating Vermont's progress in meeting smart growth goals through government policies, programs, and
public investments. This report concluded that although Vermont has:
instituted many policies and programs that are designated to or have the effect of combating
sprawl,...some of the indirect effects of state actions and some projects funded with state grants or
loans have led to sprawl or created conditions that could lead to sprawl. Furthermore, sprawl has
hidden costs that have been subsidized through state programs that were not intended to have
negative sprawl impacts. (Dunkiel 1)
Fortunately, it appears that VSGS's report was taken to heart as several attempts, beginning in 2003 with
Governor Douglas, have been made to put more teeth into the growth center concept by creating incentives
for municipalities and developers to concentrate new development in designated growth centers, such as
priority consideration for state agencies and funding programs and Act 250 benefits. These efforts
culminated in 2006 with the passage of Act 183, also known as the growth centers legislation, "to promote
compact development over sprawl in municipalities that are facing development pressure" (Growth Center
Planning 6). As John Ewing, Board Chair for the Vermont Forum on Sprawl, stated after the bill's passage,
"Since Act 250 was enacted, Vermont has lacked a strategy to identify areas appropriate for growth and
target state investments to those areas. The bill does just that" (Vermont State 7). At this point in time,
Vermont's DHCA and its Natural Resources Board are in the process of implementing the growth centers
program mandated by Act 183, including application requirements, criteria for growth center designation,
benefits of designation, and a Growth Centers Planning Manual. Thus, it is too early to predict the true
impact of this latest effort at fostering smart growth in Vermont. Nonetheless, one can only hope that
twenty years from now, assuming that John DeGrove is still commenting upon smart growth in the United
States, that Act 183 will be portrayed in his future publications as having been more influential in curbing
sprawl than Vermont's first major smart growth policy, Act 250.
The Wastewater Barrier to Smart Growth
It is well documented that the existence of high-capacity public sewer services enables buildings to be
constructed higher and closer together than would be possible using only private, onsite systems, such as
septic tanks, to treat and dispose of waste. These private systems rely on soil to treat and discharge
wastewater and thus generally require large lots and low-density development on the land to function
properly and prevent ground water contamination. "When densities rise, however, ground water quality can
begin to suffer" (Knapp 6). Public sewer systems, which often discharge treated wastewater into large
bodies of water or large leach fields, can better accommodate more intensive land uses, including industrial
or commercial facilities. This increased density and intensity of use facilitated by public sewer systems
makes land more attractive for development and, in fact, the existence of public infrastructure, such as
sewer facilities, can be a factor for developers in determining where to build.
Given the ability of public sewer systems to accommodate dense, mixed-use development, it can be
argued that public sewer systems are an important tool for achieving smart growth. Indeed, new sewer
projects or sewer extensions can enable smart growth to occur if zoning or sewer ordinance controls are
put in place to limit service to properties in designated growth centers. However, there is a plethora of
literature documenting the more common outcome associated with new and expanded public wastewater
systems, sprawl. Since these systems are very expensive to build and operate, municipalities, especially in
more rural areas with relatively small tax bases, try to offset these costs by expanding the service area,
resulting in sprawling development. In addition, as Stephen Gasteyer and Jason Gray comment in their
article on rural sprawl, "state and federal funding agencies have not tended to require planning to ensure
that communities maintain a rural character so that infrastructure dollars do not lead to a transformation
from rural town to sprawling outlying suburb" (10). Without policies to prioritize funding sewer systems that
serve growth centers, this phenomenon of sprawl will continue to occur. Until recently, this was indeed the
case in Vermont. In their progress report on smart growth in the state, the Vermont Smart Growth
Collaborative points out that during a five-year period in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the State funded
thirty-six sewer projects, including new projects and extensions of existing systems (Dunkiel 19). While
many of these projects either targeted specific environmental problems or did not significantly increase
capacity or service areas, thirteen of the funded projects do have the potential to cause sprawl (Dunkiel
19). Nonetheless, this is less likely to happen in the future, since as part of a major overhaul of their
Environmental Protection Rules in 2002, Vermont's Agency of Natural Resources updated their funding
priority system to specify that public funding can only be used for sewer expansions or new systems
serving designated growth centers. While an important issue to mention, this well-documented topic of
public sewer systems causing sprawl is not the focus of this thesis. Rather, it is how a lack of public
wastewater facilities in growth centers poses a barrier to achieving smart growth in Vermont.
Using data on direct and indirect discharge permits'0 issued by the Vermont Department of Environmental
Conservation (DEC), a summer research study conducted by interns at Vermont's DHCA in 2006
concluded that in Vermont, 176 or nearly 70% of Vermont's 255 towns do not have a public wastewater
treatment facility of any kind (Markarian and McEntee). In addition, while several municipalities, such as
Burlington and South Burlington, have sewer systems that serve close to 100% of households and
businesses, these are in the minority (Markarian and McEntee). Many of the public wastewater treatment
facilities in Vermont do not serve all residents or businesses of the town in which they are located. For
example, Hinesburg's system with a capacity to treat 250,000 gallons/day only serves 28% of households,
and the system in Springfield, with much greater treatment capacity at 2.2 million gallons/day, only serves
60% of households (Markarian and McEntee). As a result, it is likely that over 44% of Vermont's population
of approximately 609,000 does not have access to public wastewater treatment, and thus private, onsite
sewage systems are used to collect, treat, and disperse much of the household and commercial
wastewater generated in the state (Markarian and McEntee). In addition, it is important to note that,
according to the DHCA, as of March 2007, although all currently designated downtowns in Vermont have
publicly managed sewer, 48% of designated village centers are still unsewered. While onsite systems are
very common across the United States, especially rural areas, the percentage of Vermonters using these
systems is well above the national average of 25% of the country's population and 33% of new
development in the United States (Geisinger and Chartier 6). As stated previously, high-capacity public
wastewater systems tend to enable a built environment that is denser and includes more intensive uses
than would be possible on land serviced by onsite systems. Therefore, the lack of publicly managed high-
capacity wastewater treatment service in much of Vermont means that redevelopment of historic buildings,
along with new housing and commercial development in growth centers, can be severely limited.
Along with escalating development pressures and increased support for smart growth and the growth
centers concept, Vermonters have begun to realize that this barrier of wastewater treatment capacity to
achieving smart growth exists. In fact, many towns have started to investigate alternative wastewater
management options because existing methods for handling wastewater will not enable these towns to
accommodate dense, mixed-use development in their growth centers. This is not to say that growing public
awareness of the environmental and public health hazards associated with poorly managed wastewater
10 Direct and indirect discharge permits are issued for public and private wastewater treatment systems in Vermont. The terms
'direct' and 'indirect' refer to the manner by which treated wastewater is dispersed, either directly into surface waters or indirectly
through the soil and groundwater system.
has not contributed to this surge in new wastewater treatment feasibility studies and construction projects.
Indeed, the State's overhaul of its onsite wastewater regulations in 2002 that are slated to take effect in
July 2007 have caused many towns to scramble to find ways to address groundwater contamination in their
communities. However, it is important to note that the desire to channel new development into growth
centers is an important contributing factor motivating towns to increase their wastewater treatment capacity.
There are numerous examples highlighting the reality of the wastewater barrier to smart growth in Vermont.
For example, a 1999 growth centers report prepared by the Vermont Planners Association mentions that
the Town of Waitsfield has designated two growth centers in its town plan and has made a deliberate
attempt to concentrate development in these areas. However, "while largely successful, the effort is limited
by dependence on on-site sewage disposal" (Growth Centers 9). Waitsfield is not alone in this predicament
as demonstrated by the information compiled in a 2006 report prepared for the legislature entitled
Implementing Growth Centers in Vermont: A View from the Towns, which presented findings gleaned from
surveys and forums involving planning commissioners and planners across the state. One of the key
conclusions of this report was that "growth center planning efforts frequently encounter obstacles. The
most common is the lack of infrastructure (primarily water and sewer service) to support additional
development in growth centers, particularly at moderate densities" (Munson 1). Around the same time, as
the legislature was debating Act 183 (the growth centers bill ultimately passed during that legislative
session), the Vermont Planners Association online message board hosted a discussion among planning
professionals in the state regarding wastewater and smart growth. Some salient comments included the
following:
* It's kind of disingenuous to promote dense development with this barrier [unsewered
villages and difficult physical constraints for soils-based treatments] still so prevalent.
* The single most important thing Vt could do to implement growth ctrs would be to make it
easier and less expensive for communities to create public systems.
* The most important thing VT could do to implement growth centers is to create and
improve our public wastewater treatment infrastructure.
* This [wastewater treatment infrastructure] is one of the two primary elements that local
communities bring to the table when new neighborhoods, potential employers,
desperately needed affordable housing, and small business projects are contemplated in
our growth centers. Without a real and substantial State (and Federal) investment in our
public infrastructure (especially wastewater treatment capacity), no amount of regulatory
"reform" will be able to attract positive and substantial development to our growth centers.
Vermont will continue to slowly slip away from the dream of vibrant villages and cities
surrounded by pastoral rural countryside, if we don't make a commitment to the public
resources that make growth centers a viable and desirable choice as communities
change.
If we're going to promote more dense development, which has been the goal here for
eons, well, we're just kidding ourselves if the infrastructure isn't there to support it.("Wastewater")
Even more recently, in an unpublished press release prepared during July 2006 by DHCA regarding a grant
the Department received to make the public more aware of wastewater management options, the
Downtown Development Coordinator for the Vermont Downtown Program was quoted as saying, "in our
work with villages around the state, we continue to find that sewage remains a key issue to community
vitality and future growth. Many communities simply can't host new homes or commercial development in
their village area until sewage capacity is available" ("VT Receives"). Additionally, a demonstration of the
number of towns dealing with insufficient wastewater capacity can be found in an unpublished research
study conducted by the DHCA in 2006. This study documented"1 twenty towns in Vermont that had or were
in the process of completing feasibility studies and/or implementing new wastewater treatment projects (not
sewer extensions or replacements) in the previous decade, both to solve existing groundwater
contamination problems and to enable development in their growth centers. The research indicated that:
* Six towns had implemented new wastewater management projects,
* Eight towns had completed feasibility studies but had yet to start implementation,
* Two towns were in the process of completing feasibility studies, and
* Four towns had completed very preliminary feasibility forecasts. (Markarian and McEntee)
Most recently, as part of a project to educate local decision-makers on wastewater treatment options,
DHCA created a steering committee comprised of municipal officials, planners, state and federal agency
and congressional staff, consultants, and housing, environmental, smart growth and historic preservation
advocates to better understand the problems associated with wastewater treatment in the state. The
minutes from the committee's February 2007 meeting indicate that indeed, one of the biggest constraints to
smart growth in Vermont is wastewater treatment capacity, especially when it comes to developing densely,
creating affordable housing, and preserving Vermont's historic villages12. Thus it seems that insufficient
wastewater treatment capacity and a lack public oversight of wastewater management certainly pose a
significant barrier to achieving smart growth in many small Vermont towns. It is important to point out,
11 Documentation was based on a review of Vermont Municipal Planning Grants and HUD Community Development Block
Grants during the last decade, a review of Vermont's Municipal Pollution Control Priority List and Clean Water Intended Use
Plans from 2004 -2006, and follow-up interviews with project stakeholders.
12 The minutes from this meeting can be found at http:llwww.dhca.state.vt.us/PlanninaNillageWastewater.htm.
however, that while capacity is definitely an issue, a large treatment facility and sewer system may not
necessarily be the answer for some of these towns.
Many communities, especially smaller rural communities, both do not need and cannot afford a high-
capacity public wastewater treatment plant and pipe system. This does not mean that they cannot address
their wastewater capacity issues, though. The body of literature dedicated to the centralized versus
decentralizedl 3 wastewater management debate in this country certainly indicates that small communities
can and should seek out the more innovative and cost-effective decentralized wastewater management
solutions that exist. In fact, in its report to Congress in 1997, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
"declared that the era of 'sewer everything' was over, [and] decentralized wastewater management had to
form an integral part of the nation's means for dealing with sewage" (Feinbaum 36). In this report, the EPA
stated that, "adequately managed decentralized wastewater treatment systems can be a cost effective and
long-term option for meeting public health and water quality goals, particularly for small, suburban and rural
areas" (Hoover 3).
Given that decentralized wastewater management is a relatively new concept, its acceptance and
implementation has only started to increase in recent years. In an effort to foster the use of the
decentralized approach, many states have published guidance documents to assist municipalities in
evaluating their wastewater treatment options, including publications in Maine and Rhode Island that
specifically address how decentralized wastewater management can often be a more feasible and cost-
effective approach for small towns looking to address their wastewater treatment capacity barrier to smart
growth (Joubert et al. and Richart). In addition, states, including Vermont, have prioritized state funding for
projects that have investigated their decentralized options. However, it is important to mention that while
municipalities should definitely consider the decentralized approach, it simply may be neither feasible nor
more cost effective than a centralized sewer system.
For instance, in Vermont, there are towns where high seasonal groundwater tables, shallow impervious
soils, shallow bedrock, and limited lot sizes do not enable any combination of innovative or alternative
13 Centralized systems consist of direct connections by pipe of untreated sewage to a central treatment plat that discharges
treated water to a large body of water or to a large leach field. Decentralized systems, on the other hand, involve the centralized
administration and management of one or more types of wastewater treatment systems, such as individual on-site septic tanks,
septic systems serving multiple buildings or properties, and traditional sewer systems.
wastewater treatment solutions. For example, in Pownal, twenty-six individual and clustered on-site
options were considered and deemed infeasible prior to the implementation of a much more expensive
centralized treatment facility (Markarian and McEntee). In addition, while some experts assert that
decentralized systems may be more affordable for small towns than centralized systems, others maintain
that "where construction of new onsite or cluster systems is involved...the construction, operation, and
maintenance costs may in some cases be comparable to the cost of constructing and operating a
traditional [centralized] sewer system" (Hoover 10). Indeed, although some claim that the State's priority
ranking system for funding wastewater projects favors centralized systems, according to the Department of
Environmental Conservation, this is not the case. In reality, as stated by DEC staff, decentralized systems
have actually not proved to be technically feasible, economical, or acceptable to residents in all the cases
where they have been considered during the planning phase.
Whether a town should or can use the decentralized approach to wastewater management is not
something this thesis will answer, however. Nonetheless, it is important to glean from this discussion that a
centralized sewer system is not necessarily the answer for Vermont towns looking to channel development
into their growth centers. However, due to physical and financial constraints in some towns, a centralized
system may be the best choice. In addition, whether a town determines that its needs are best met by a
centralized or decentralized system, both cost a significant amount of money relative to the tax base of
most Vermont towns and the income levels of their residents. Therefore, insufficient wastewater treatment
capacity in and of itself is not the only barrier to achieving smart growth - a complimentary challenge is
financing the new wastewater management projects that will increase wastewater treatment capacity to
enable such compact growth, a topic to be explored in the next chapter.
Conclusion
Although it is debatable whether smart growth is the best way to plan and develop in this country, this
thesis is based on the premise that implementing the smart growth concept is advantageous to society.
Therefore, since Vermont is attempting to manage its growth by channeling new development into
designated growth centers, it is important to recognize the barriers to achieving this smart growth goal and
propose potential solutions. As this chapter has demonstrated, a challenge many Vermont municipalities
face in planning for their growth centers is a lack of wastewater treatment capacity. It is true that some
policy makers and local decision makers are aware of this problem, and actually DHCA has recently
spearheaded an effort to educate the public about the range of alternatives for public wastewater treatment
that exist and to help communities find the most cost-effective solutions for their individual situation. While
it is critical that small towns better understand their options when it comes to wastewater treatment and
select the most appropriate and cost-effective alternative for their growth centers, it is important to
remember that any project represents a significant investment for a small Vermont town. Therefore, more
attention needs to be paid to this financing obstacle, and the following chapter begins to explore this
challenge of financing wastewater infrastructure projects in Vermont that can enable sufficient wastewater
treatment capacity to accommodate dense, mixed-use growth centers.
Chapter 3
WASTEWATER INFRASTRUCTURE FINANCING IN SMALL COMMUNITIES
Since the late 1980s, while steadily increasing mandates for clean water, the federal government has
consistently decreased its commitment to making it happen, shifting the burden of financing water and
wastewater facilities to state and local governments. The decrease in available federal grant funding, along
with ever-rising costs to plan for and construct wastewater infrastructure, makes implementing wastewater
projects extremely difficult, especially in smaller, more rural communities like those found throughout
Vermont. There are, however, some federal and state grant programs available to Vermont communities
and a range of debt financing options. Indeed, until recently, the State's low-interest loan pool has had
more than enough funds to assist all of Vermont's wastewater-related projects. In the coming years,
however, with more towns looking to invest in wastewater infrastructure to enable growth center
development and many of the older sewer systems in Vermont needing significant upgrades, this pool of
funds may not meet the demand. In addition, even if sufficient loan funds are available, many of the small
unsewered Vermont towns that are looking to improve their wastewater treatment capacity in an effort to
build more densely in their growth centers simply do not have the resources to repay this debt. Since
financing barriers seem to be a deal killer on many wastewater infrastructure projects that would enable
growth center development in Vermont, this chapter explores the wastewater funding issue in detail. The
chapter begins with a historical and national overview of wastewater infrastructure funding, then moves
onto Vermont's financial assistance programs, as well as other federal, state, and local funding options,
and ends with a discussion of some of the financing challenges specific to small communities.
Funding Needs
New wastewater infrastructure projects (not upgrades or extensions) that have been completed in the last
decade in Vermont have ranged in cost from just under $500,000 to nearly $30 million, depending on the
type of system, number of properties served, allowance for new growth, and physical constraints
(Markarian and McEntee). Recent feasibility studies for new wastewater systems in several Vermont
communities estimate costs that likewise vary widely, depending on the type and scope of the project
(Markarian and McEntee). If these figures seem high now, the reality is that project costs will continue to
increase in the coming years due to rising labor and construction costs and higher interest rates. In
addition, shrinking government budgets and staff that result in longer regulatory and funding processes will
extend project timelines and, likewise, project costs.
These costs, however, only refer to the capital necessary for the initial construction of the project. It is
important to keep in mind that new wastewater infrastructure not only requires financial resources for
planning and construction but also for the recurring costs associated with operation, maintenance, and
upgrades. This thesis focuses on the financial barrier that towns face in obtaining sufficient capital for
construction, as that is the first and primary hurdle communities must overcome in planning for new
wastewater projects, but it is imperative that municipalities consider the funding options for on-going
operations and maintenance in planning for such a project, as well.
Vermont communities are certainly not alone in their need for wastewater infrastructure capital, as an
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) publication in 2003 states that "several studies have highlighted
the need for substantial investment in the nation's drinking water and wastewater infrastructure" (Handbook
1). To substantiate its claim, the report cites an earlier EPA infrastructure funding gap analysis that
estimates the capital needs for clean water and drinking water between 2000 and 2019 will be over $660
billion (Handbook 1). Both federal and state governments recognize this need and, one might argue, have
responded favorably with multiple grant and loan programs described later in this chapter. However,
government assistance has certainly declined since the heyday of federal grant programs for infrastructure
projects in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Trends in Federal Funding
When the Federal Water Pollution Control Act14 of 1948 was amended in 1972, the federal govemment
called for a public works program to ensure the water quality standards outlined in the statute could be met,
and billions of dollars in grant funds were made available to local govemments for constructing and
improving thousands of water and wastewater facilities (Raftelis 1 and Clean and Safe 2-2). A Minnesota
handbook on wastewater management mentions that at that time, "if a project received a high priority rating
because of need and water quality problems, it may have been subsidized nearly 100 percent [by the
federal govemment]" (Olson et al. 6.2). As a result, numerous large, centralized wastewater systems were
14 After this law was later amended in 1977, it became more commonly known as the Clean Water Act.
constructed across the country during the 1970s and 1980s, including in several cities and towns in
Vermont (Activity 1). Today, however, this so called 'free money' is rarely available (Olson et al. 6.2).
While revisions to the Clean Water Act have mandated increasingly stricter environmental standards over
time, grant funding for water and wastewater infrastructure projects has steadily declined (Raftelis 2, 14
and Clean and Safe 2-2). This decrease began in 1987 when the Water Quality Act amended the Clean
Water Act and, among other changes, began to phase out grant funding for wastewater system
construction projects, shifting federal financial support to loan programs. As part of this amendment, the
EPA was authorized to provide seed money to States so that they could establish Clean Water State
Revolving Fund (CWSRF) programs' s, with States providing a match of at least 20% of the annual
capitalization grants they receive from the federal government. While each state program is unique and the
funds are prioritized differently, CWSRF programs essentially provide a source of below-market rate loans
to eligible communities for the planning and construction of water quality projects'6. As with all revolving
funds, once repaid, the principal and interest can be used for financing new projects. In 2003, the EPA
reported that since 1988, CWSRFs across the country have financed 12,500 projects totaling nearly $39
billion, and these programs are currently lending over $4 billion to projects annually (Activity 2). While
CWSRFs certainly contribute to the funding of wastewater facilities, they still only meet a small percentage
of the financing needs for water quality projects in each state, even when States contribute more than the
20% required match to their revolving funds (Holcombe 51).
Although it is in a much more limited capacity than in the 1970s and 80s, the EPA and other federal
agencies do contribute some grant funds for wastewater projects, especially in more rural and distressed
communities. For example, the EPA has determined that between FY 1991 and FY 2000, nine federal
agencies contributed approximately $44 billion in drinking water and wastewater funds (Handbook 1).
While a majority of those funds were designated for seeding state revolving funds, 43% of that money was
granted to communities for their water quality projects (Handbook 1). In addition, the as a result of federal
grant funding cuts over time, many states have established their own grant programs for wastewater
projects. For instance, the General Accounting Office has identified 120 programs in forty-six states that
15 Drinking Water State Revolving Funds (DWSRF) were also established to finance drinking water systems. Due to the nature
of some wastewater projects addressing pollution control and drinking water issues, some towns have accessed both fund pools.
However, I will not go into detail on this program as it does not deal directly with wastewater projects.
16 CWSRF money can be used to for wastewater treatment, watershed and estuary management projects, and other projects
that address non-point source pollution control problems.
provide funding for drinking water or wastewater infrastructure projects (Handbook 2). Vermont is included
in this figure as it provides both grants and loans to municipalities for their pollution control projects, as
described in the following section.
State Funding Programs in Vermont
In Vermont, the State provides financial assistance to towns for the planning and construction of wastewater
infrastructure projects primarily via below-market loans from the CWSRF and state pollution control grants17.
Each year, the legislature appropriates funds for pollution control programs in general, including the state
match for the CWSRF, an annual contribution to the grant program, special earmarks, and an allowance for
the administration of the pollution control programs, provided by the Agency of Natural Resources'
Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC), in conjunction with the Vermont Municipal Bond Bank.
Municipal pollution control grants are made available to towns for combined sewer overflow projects,
phosphorous removal projects, dry weather flow projects18, and, in limited instances, sludge and septage
facilities, with new wastewater infrastructure projects generally qualifying for funding under the dry weather
flow category. These types of projects are eligible to receive up to 35% of the project costs in grant funds,
and grants are distributed according to the Municipal Pollution Control Priority System, which ranks projects
based on points given in thirteen rating categories. Projects are rated based on the population and median
income of residents to be served by the project, a cost-benefit analysis, the project's ability to eliminate
public health hazards, combined sewer overflows, raw sewage discharges, and treated discharges, to abate
or remove oxygen consuming pollutants and phosphorous, and to restore water use for activities such as
fishing and swimming (Environmental 6-10). It is interesting to note that while state grant funds may only be
awarded to projects serving properties within a growth center, the ranking system itself does not consider a
project's smart growth attributes. Therefore, if a town wants to improve its wastewater treatment capacity to
better enable growth center development but has few pollution problems, it will rank very low on the list. In
fact, towns with no documented pollution issues that wish to implement a wastewater infrastructure project
to enable smart growth are not even eligible for these grants, with the exception of Waitsfield, which was
given special legislative approval to be made eligible.
17 Other state agencies do have grant programs for which wastewater projects may be eligible, as discussed later in the chapter.
18 Dry weather flow refers to pollution that occurs even when there is no heavy rainfall.
Another kink in the pollution control grant program that makes it difficult for towns to access grant funds for
new wastewater infrastructure projects to enable smart growth is that these projects are competing for grant
funds with the three other categories of eligible projects. For instance, as per DEC, the municipal pollution
control grants program was allocated $3,905,620, $4,462,617, and $4,715,703 in fiscal years 2004, 2005,
and 2006, respectively, all of which was expended. However, the program only disbursed an average of
14% of those funds in each of the three years to dry weather flow projects19. Furthermore, as indicated by
DEC, several years ago the legislature mandated that all pollution control projects applying for grants at that
time be funded for the full 35% of project costs without appropriating additional resources at that time to do
so. Therefore, every year, grant funds continue to be disbursed to those few projects until the commitments
are paid off, which, according to DEC, is likely to occur by 2011, as long as annual appropriations continue
at the current level. In the meantime, though, no other projects have the opportunity to access these grant
funds despite their ranking on the priority list. For example, the dry weather flow grant funds disbursed in
2004, 2005, and 2006 mentioned above all went to the wastewater project in Pownal.
A quasi-grant/quasi-loan, known as a planning advance, is also available from the State for towns during the
planning phase of a wastewater project. Essentially, the advances are interest-free loans that must be
repaid when construction begins and a construction grant or loan is secured. If the project does not move
forward, though, the funds do not have to be repaid. According to DEC, however, given that many projects
have not moved beyond the feasibility stage due to cost constraints in recent years, to receive one of these
advances (typically only a few studies are given funds each year), the proposed feasibility study must
comply with strict departmental requirements.
Vermont also makes capital available to wastewater infrastructure projects via 20-year loans at 2% from its
CWSRF. As different from the pollution control grants program, any type of water pollution control project,
including upgrades and extensions of existing sewer systems, may apply for a CWSRF loan. Although
competition for these funds has not been a problem to date as demand has not exceeded supply, this is
likely to change in the near future, for several reasons. First, the 2% interest rate is actually an
administrative fee and thus does not replenish the fund. Second, federal capitalization grants have steadily
been decreasing over time. For instance, federal capitalization grants to Vermont have dwindled from
$6,467,800 in FY03 to $4,242,300 in FY06 (Pollution). At the same time, the State has maintained a policy
19 Dry weather flow projects received $415,917, $315,738, and $1,085,937 in 2004, 2005, and 2006, respectively.
of only contributing the minimal 20% match in an effort to allocate as much in grant funds to the pollution
control programs as possible. Finally, the demand for loan funds seems to be on an upward swing, due to
rising planning and construction costs, growing interest in pollution control projects to address water quality
issues and advance smart growth, and the fact that several sewer systems across the state that were built
approximately twenty years ago are starting to need major upgrades. For example, according to DEC, the
amount of loans disbursed per year has grown from $3,888,582 in fiscal year 2004 to $10,887,562 in fiscal
year 2006. Furthermore, as stated by a DEC official, as of March 2006, $21 million was available in the
loan fund but an estimated $33 million would be requested by communities by the end of FY07. This staff
person indicated that many towns end up requesting fewer funds than they estimate in any given year due
to project delays, so it may actually be a few more years before demand really exceeds supply.
Nonetheless, it is likely that the ability for new wastewater infrastructure projects to access these loan funds
will be limited in the future. In addition, as with the grant program, loans are distributed according to the
Municipal Pollution Control Priority system. Therefore, if the ranking system needs to be employed down
the road due to demand exceeding supply, wastewater projects designed to address smart growth barriers
will similarly be at a disadvantage. However, these state grants and loans are only one piece of the
financing picture, and thus the following section details the range of funding options small communities are
likely to consider in piecing together a financing plan for their wastewater infrastructure projects.
Financing Options
Although at one time the federal govemment could be counted on to fund nearly all of the costs associated
with a new wastewater project, today the federal government's financial contribution is but one of many
resources towns amass to make their wastewater projects feasible. Indeed, as George Raftelis comments
in his comprehensive wastewater financing guide, "in today's complex financial market, it is more likely that
a utility will utilize a variety of funding methods to maximize the financing objectives of the utility" (28).
Fortunately, a range of financing options in the form of grants and debt has emerged that municipalities can
choose from, along with multiple options for repaying their debt obligations20. Nevertheless, understanding
these alternatives and determining which is most appropriate for a particular project can be quite
challenging, especially for small towns, as discussed later in the chapter. Therefore, this and the following
three sections attempt to inform the reader of the financing mechanisms and funding sources small
20 Although not extremely common today (in 2000, only 15% of wastewater utilities were owned by private companies in the US),
privatization is also an option (Raftelis 107).
municipalities tend to use for their wastewater projects23. However, before detailing these possibilities, it is
important to identify trends in the financing of wastewater projects in small Vermont towns in recent years.
Town & Project Total ERUs CostIERU Funding Sources Loan Repayment
Description Cost21 Sources
Cabot: centralized $4.9 mil 140 $35,000 * EPA Grants: 32% Connected users
treatment facility with * USDA Grant: 16% via fees
direct discharge * USDA Loan: 12%
* DWF Grant: 28%
* Other State Grants: 10%
* Other State Loan: 1%
* Creamery Owner: 1%
Charlotte: centralized $1.7 mil * DWF Grant: 3% Increase in
treatment of pumped * CWSRF Loan: 88% homeowner land
septage with indirect * Local Appropriation: 7% leases
discharge into a sand * Other: 2%
filter/ leach field




Pownal: centralized $29 mil 700 $41,400 * EPA STAG: 26% $76 flat tax per
treatment facility with * HUD CDBG: 5% improved parcel
direct discharge * USDA Grant: 12% per year (lower for
* USDA Loan: 7% unimproved
* DWF Grant: 30% parcels) and variety
* State Appropriation: 1% of fees
* Other State Grants: 3%
* TBD 22: 16%
Shoreham: small $2.4 mil 86 $27,900 * DWF Grant: 34% $.045 increase in
collection system for * CWSRF Loan: 7% town property
village with diffused * Other: 59% taxand variety of
discharge fees
Warren: decentralized $4.7 mil 115 $40,900 * EPA STAG: 28% $.017 increase in
demonstration project * Other EPA Grants: 32% town property tax
* DWF Grant: 19% and variety of fees
* CWSRF Loan: 18%
* Local Appropriation: 3%
* Other State and Regional
Grants: < 1%
21 All numbers in the table are rounded.
22 The town is still applying for and receiving gap funds.
23 I based my decision on which sources to include based on interviews with wastewater engineers and DEC staff, as well as a
review of sources for proposed and completed wastewater project in Vermont, and federal and state publications on the topic.
The table above summarizes the six wastewater projects initiated in Vermont from 1996 - 2006 in small
towns that previously did not have any public wastewater infrastructure. The information in the table is
based on a cost comparison table created by Forcier Aldrich & Associates, as well as follow-up interviews
with the engineering consultants for each project. I should also note that although non-responsive
consultants and the fact that some projects are not fully constructed resulted in a table that is somewhat
incomplete, the available information is quite illustrative of the wastewater financing story in Vermont.
It is true that all projects are quite distinct, but as the table above indicates, there are several common
financing trends among recent projects. For instance, while all projects differ in type and scope, the cost
per equivalent residential user (ERU) 24 is actually not all that dissimilar, and thus provides towns with an
idea of what these kinds of projects are likely to cost, barring any unforeseeable complications and
accounting for inflation. Another trend of note is that, except for East St. Johnsbury, all projects have
needed to assemble multiple funding sources to make the project feasible, including federal and state
grants, loans, and earmarks, as well as taxes, fees, and budget appropriations at the local level, indicating
that towns need to be prepared to investigate and evaluate these multiple alternatives, as well as drum up
support at the local level for the project. In addition, Vermont's CWSRF and the USDA seem to be the
preferred debt sources, although the repayment method varies widely and is likely dependent upon local
politics. Finally, it is important to point out that, with the exception of Charlotte, all the projects have been
predominantly funded with grants and congressional earmarks. This trend is particularly unsettling given
the granting climate discussed earlier, and so it is evident that few projects will proceed in the future without
either similarly sustained subsidy levels or a much larger local contribution.
In the following three sections, I attempt to provide additional information on these and other funding
sources small Vermont towns may be able to use for their wastewater projects. It is worth pointing out that
not every source is appropriate for each community, and as George Raftelis recommends in his textbook
on wastewater financing, communities should consider project timeframe, interest rates and rate stability,
changing market conditions, tax laws, costs of issuance, applicability to the size and type of project,
administration and compliance requirements, and public acceptance in determining which sources are most
feasible and appropriate for their particular project (97 - 101). I begin the discussion below with grants, as
24 ERU stands for equivalent residential user and is a means for comparing the number of users when properties may contain
single family homes, apartment buildings, mobile homes, and businesses.
they have tended to be the dominant funding source on Vermont projects to date. I then move onto the
most commonly used debt alternatives, and I end with the options towns have for repaying such debt.
Grant Funding
In addition to the State's pollution control grants mentioned earlier in this chapter, there are several other
established federal and state grant programs that communities in Vermont are eligible to apply for when it
comes to their wastewater projects. However, as the funding sources of recent wastewater projects shown
in the table above indicate, communities may be able to access special federal, state, and private grant
programs, depending on the unique attributes of the project. Nonetheless, most major grants come from
the funding programs described below. In addition, I should note that the federal government does have
several wastewater-related grant programs 25 for which Vermont towns are not eligible, and thus I have not
included them in the list below.
For each grant program, I provide a very brief description and, where applicable, mention which towns in
Vermont have used these programs in recent years. This information is simply intended to orient the
reader to the types of programs available and agencies involved, and thus comprehensive information on
each program and community eligibility is not included. However, if the reader is interested in learning
more about any of these grant programs, the agency or department administering each program generally
has more details and contact information on its website.
EPA Hardship Grants for Rural Communities
These grants are designed to assist rural, disadvantaged communities with fewer than 3,000 residents that
cannot afford to repay CWSRF loans. For example, the town of Cabot received a hardship grant along with
its CWSRF loan so that repayment of the loan would be affordable for residents.
EPA State and Tribal Assistance Grants (STAG)
Each year, the US Congress identifies specific projects that will receive funding from the EPA's STAG
program in its Appropriations Bill. Unlike the EPA's other grant and loan programs, STAG funds are
actually an earmark and are thus "very politically charged," according to several consultants who have
25 For example, the Colonias Program for unincorporated communities along the US/Mexico border and three programs run in
conjunction with other federal agencies that target wastewater infrastructure assistance to American Indians, Alaska Natives, and
the thirteen states of Appalachia.
helped communities pursue them. As one state official commented, "it's like horse trading essentially." In
Vermont, several projects have been successful in obtaining these funds, however. For example, East St.
Johnsbury's small wastewater project was fully financed with nearly $500,000 in STAG funds while Warren
and Pownal received $1,301,000 and $7,410,000, respectively.
HUD Community Development Block Grants (CDBG)
HUD provides annual allocations either directly to entitlement communities26 or to states to distribute
among smaller communities. In Vermont, the City of Burlington is the only entitlement community, and thus
most CDBG funds are administered by the Vermont Community Development Program (VCDP). Vermont
CDBG grants can be used for either planning or implementation of multiple types of projects and programs,
including wastewater infrastructure projects. However, funded projects must meet at least one national and
one state objective27. It is interesting to note that across the country in FY 2002, non-entitlement
communities spent approximately 33.6% of their CDBG grant funds on drinking water and wastewater
infrastructure improvements (Handbook 8). In Vermont, Pownal recently received $1.5 million in CDBG
funds for the wastewater infrastructure that would benefit low-income mobile home park residents.
USDA Rural Development Water and Environmental Program
The USDA provides grants to rural communities with populations under 10,000 who cannot otherwise
finance their wastewater projects. These grants are designed to accompany a loan provided by the same
program so that the cost to property owners is affordable, given the income level of the community28. In
Vermont, both Pownal and Cabot have used some combination of USDA grants and loans to fund their
wastewater projects.
EDA Grants for Public Works and Development Facilities
EDA grants can be used for planning and construction of wastewater facilities that will attract new
development and jobs to economically distressed areas. None of the projects in Vermont in recent years
26 Communities eligible to become entitlement communities are 1) Principal cities of Metropolitan Statistical Areas, 2) Other
metropolitan cities with a population over 50,000, and 3) Qualified urban counties with a population over 200,000 (Community).
27 National objectives include: benefit low and moderate income households, aid in the prevention and elimination of slums and
blight, and meet community development needs of a particular urgency. State objectives include: conserve, expand, and
improve housing, create and retain employment, and improve public facilities in support of housing or economic development
activities, or where there is a threat to public health and safety (VCDP).
28 USDA policy is that equivalent residential users (ERU) can afford to contribute a minimum of $400 per year to paying off the
debt, and so grant funds are used to bring the loan burden per ERU to that amount.
have received EDA grants for wastewater infrastructure projects, but according to one engineering
consultant, more towns are now exploring this possibility.
Vermont Department of Environmental Conservation, Municipal Pollution Control Grants
These grants, described in detail on page four of this chapter, are available to towns for combined sewer
overflow projects, phosphorous removal projects, dry weather flow projects, and, in limited instances,
sludge and septage facilities. These types of projects are eligible to receive up to 35% of the project costs
in grant funds, and grants are distributed according to the Municipal Pollution Control Priority System.
Vermont Department of Housing and Community Affairs, Municipal Planning Grants (MPG)
These very competitive grants can be used by municipalities for a variety of planning projects. While not
available for construction capital, many towns in Vermont have used MPGs to partially fund feasibility
studies related to their wastewater infrastructure projects, sometimes combining this funding with the
planning advances provided by DEC.
It is evident that there are several sources of grant funds for Vermont communities interested in improving
their wastewater infrastructure. However, with an ever-increasing number of towns seeking these funds
and the decreasing capitalization of these programs, nearly all communities must also secure debt
financing for their wastewater projects, as detailed in the following section.
Debt Financing
While any community would certainly prefer to fully fund its wastewater project with grants, given the limited
and dwindling amount of grant funds available from federal and state programs, as well as the extremely
competitive nature of grant programs, most communities must fund a portion of their wastewater
infrastructure projects with some form of debt, either via bonds or loans. For instance, the experience of
the six Vermont communities in the table on page seven of this chapter indicates that towns have had to
obtain debt to cover between 7% and 88% of project costs.
Although none of the projects in Vermont in recent years have obtained bonds for their wastewater
projects, bonds can be an option for municipalities, given that the interest payments on municipal debt are
tax-exempt, and thus investors are willing to accept lower interest rates (Improving 75). In fact, as George
Raftelis states in his book on wastewater financing, "nowhere else in the world are utilities given the facility
to borrow on a routine basis at rates that are tax-exempt. As a result, there have to be persuasive reasons
why a government utility that is eligible for tax-exempt financing would consider private financing for utility
assets" (63). While it is true that small municipalities almost never use commercial bank loans for
wastewater projects, there are several government loan programs that offer below-market interest rates,
credit risk guarantees, and/or flexible repayment options that make borrowing from them an attractive
alternative to bonds (Improving 75). Indeed, the experience of the recent wastewater projects in Vermont
indicates that the CWSRF and USDA loans are popular for small communities looking to acquire long-term
debt29 to finance their wastewater projects. Therefore, the following list of debt sources focuses on the
CWSRF and USDA loan programs, as well as one bond resource available to Vermont towns.
Vermont's Clean Water State Revolving Fund
Along with administrative assistance from the Vermont Municipal Bond Bank (VMBB), Vermont's DEC
manages the State's CWSRF, first described on page five of this chapter. This option usually provides
communities with the lowest cost debt for their wastewater projects as there is only a 2% interest rate on
these 20-year loans. To apply for one of these loans, towns must first get public approval to take on the
debt via a bond vote because the loan is secured by the general obligation of the municipality, even if the
town uses some combination of special taxes and user fees to repay the debt. VMBB then reviews the
application to determine whether a town is credit-worthy, looking at their repayment plan, whether they
have considered potential future expenses, and how much tolerance property owners have to paying
increased taxes and/or fees. According to VMBB, organized towns generally do not have a problem
demonstrating ability to pay. Rather, it is often the small, poorly managed utility districts that have more of
a problem obtaining these funds, and VMBB counsels them against borrowing until they improve their
financial stability and accounting records. In addition it is important to note that, as explained earlier, while
the priority ranking system has not been used to date, if the loan pool is not sufficient to cover demand in
the future, this will be an added element in the application process.
2 Municipalities may need to secure short-term debt if long-term debt and/or grant funds are not perfectly timed with project
payments. However, short-term debt sources are not discussed in this thesis as the focus of this thesis is the barrier
communities face in securing long-term financing for their wastewater infrastructure projects.
USDA Rural Development Water and Environmental Program
The USDA provides loans and loan guarantees to communities with less than 10,000 people who cannot
"obtain needed funds from commercial sources at reasonable rates and terms" (Water and Waste). The
terms of the loan are tied to the useful life of the asset, and interest rates vary according to the median
income of the service area. However, according to DEC, these loans tend to be more expensive than the
CWSRF loans, and at times have even had higher interest rates than on bonds issued by VMBB.
Nonetheless, when combined with USDA grants, this option is sometimes the most economical choice.
Vermont Municipal Bond Bank
While the type of wastewater project discussed in this thesis is likely to obtain debt from one of the other
two sources listed above, towns can use the bond bank. Also, in the coming years, if the CWSRF loan pool
is unable to meet demand as predicted, more towns may try to acquire debt through VMBB. VMBB is a
quasi-state agency that provides towns with access to municipal bond proceeds. As with most state bond
banks, once a municipality has received voter consent and its application has been approved, its bond
request is pooled with all other requests for the year, sold on the bond market as one issue, and proceeds
are loaned to the towns for up to a 20-year period. For municipalities, acquiring debt in this manner is
much less costly than if the town was to go through a public sale on its own. First, towns only have to pay
some of the bond issuance costs30 and second, given the diversity of the pool31 and VMBB's reputation, it
is able to secure lower interest rates and lower insurance rates. Furthermore, VMBB provides technical
assistance to towns regarding their application and subsequent federal disclosure paperwork. VMBB
requires municipalities to pay back principal and interest twice a year, and municipalities are not allowed to
prepay or change the payment schedule once it has been established. However, revenue bonds can defer
principal payments for up to five years.
The existence of the above debt sources seems to indicate that capital availability is not currently a huge
problem for Vermont communities looking to implement new wastewater projects in their growth centers.
On the other hand, a pressing issue for most small Vermont towns is the ability to repay the debt issued for
wastewater infrastructure projects, as detailed in the following section.
30 In Vermont, borrowers only have to pay for their local bond counsel and for their financial audit. In addition, most towns
admitted to the pool do not have a credit rating.
31 According to an official at VMBB, most municipalities represent less than 1% of the pool. As of February 2007, the largest
borrower represented only 6% of the pool.
Debt Repayment Options
To secure any of the above sources of debt, municipalities can either pledge future revenue from the
wastewater infrastructure project or the debt can be backed by the full faith and credit of the municipality.
The latter type of debt, known as general obligation (GO) debt, is considered to provide the strongest
security pledge. Usually, GO debt does not carry coverage ratio covenants, and municipalities are able to
obtain lower interest rates with this type of debt, thus making it an attractive option. This is not always the
case, however. For example, the CWSRF loans have a fixed interest rate of 2% and no required coverage
ratios. In addition, although GO debt is the most secure, that is because it is repaid with the municipality's
tax revenue. Therefore, it tends to be more appealing for a project with full community support or where
the project directly benefits the entire community. In the case of wastewater projects that focus on
improving the wastewater treatment capacity in the growth centers of small municipalities, general
obligation debt can be a hard sell. It is true that all residents will benefit at least indirectly from the project,
but getting a majority of property owners to buy into a common vision and support increased taxes to help
pay for the infrastructure can be quite challenging, especially in towns that have scarce resources to fund
other important infrastructure investments that may directly impact more residents. In fact, several towns
that have implemented new wastewater projects in the last decade experienced one or more failed bond
votes (Markarian and McEntee).
An alternative to paying off the GO debt with an overall increase in property taxes that may be feasible in
some communities, depending on the tax base in the service area, is a special district tax. In a special
district, like a fire district, an additional flat tax or tax rate is imposed on the property owners directly
benefiting from the infrastructure. In addition, while I will put off describing it in detail at this time as I
discuss it at length in the following chapter, another option is to establish a tax-increment financing (TIF)
district32 and use increased tax revenues resulting from the improved infrastructure to repay the debt,
similarly placing the burden of repayment on the properties directly benefiting from the infrastructure.
Revenue debt, repaid with a series of fees, is also a way to shift the burden of repaying the debt to those
who directly benefit from the infrastructure investment. However, because the sources of revenue are not
as secure as a municipality's tax revenue, this debt is seen as riskier and thus may, in some cases, carry
32As first explained in the introduction, TIF essentially involves creating a district where the town wishes to encourage new
development by making improvements, such as investing in wastewater infrastructure. Then, during a period of time, anyincreases in property tax revenue generated within that district are diverted to pay off the improvements.
higher interest rates. In addition, this type of debt has higher issuance costs, and the potential volatility in
revenue may result in the need for additional guarantees, such as insurance or a reserve fund, making less
money available for the project. Nonetheless, given that wastewater infrastructure lends itself to charging
fees more than some other types of infrastructure, such as roads, revenue debt is frequently used by small
towns for their wastewater projects. Some of the more common sources of revenue for wastewater
projects in Vermont include connection and service connection fees, user fees, and management district
fees, as detailed below33:
Connection Fees
These are one-time fees charged for the privilege of connecting to the public wastewater system, with the
amount of the fee depending on whether connecting to the system is mandatory or not.
Service Connection Fees
These fees are charged when property owners create a service connection from the buildings on their
property to the wastewater system, with the amount varying depending on any pluming or topographic
issues encountered.
User Fees
These fees correspond to the actual use of the wastewater service. There are many ways to establish this
rate, but in Vermont, the annual per household fee is usually calculated by dividing total debt service and
operating costs by the number of equivalent residential units (ERUs) served.
Management District Fees
For some projects, all properties may not have to connect to the public wastewater system, but a
wastewater management district that includes all properties in a service area enables the town to not only
better monitor potential environmental problems but also secure a source of revenue for the public
infrastructure by charging for such oversight.
Even though I have described the above debt repayment options separately, it is often the case that a small
town will use a combination of tax revenue and fees to repay debt on wastewater projects. Whether a town
33 While exactions can be used to contribute revenue to the project, it is most feasible with new development in the pipeline.
chooses to repay the debt with either taxes, fees, or some combination of the two, depends on many
factors, including local support and political will, as well as the tax base, income levels of residents, and the
overall project cost being covered at the local level. For example, the towns of Cabot and Charlotte are
repaying their debt with fees from the properties in the service area, Pownal is paying off its debt with a
combination of fees and a flat tax on the properties in the service area, and Shoreham and Warren are
using a combination increased town-wide property taxes and fees from properties in the service area to
repay their debt. It is important to point out, however, that reaching consensus on how to repay the debt in
these towns was not easy, and, in fact, is one of the major challenges facing small Vermont towns, as
discussed in the next section.
Funding Challenges for Small Communities
The previous four sections have discussed the range of financing mechanisms and funding sources small
communities in Vermont are likely to consider in planning for their wastewater infrastructure projects.
However, for a small town with limited staff, investigating, understanding, and applying for many of the state
and federal grant and loan funds listed above, as well as determining the best repayment options at the
local level, can prove to be quite challenging. Therefore, towns often rely on engineering consultants to put
together their financing packages, arguably losing much control over the process. It is true that state
agencies, such as DEC and DHCA, can and have helped communities become more knowledgeable
regarding the financial realities of wastewater projects and the available funding options. In fact, DHCA is
currently working on producing educational materials and trainings for local decision makers on the many
ways towns can meet their wastewater treatment needs, including how to finance the most appropriate
solutions. This effort would likely be more effective, however, if there was improved coordination and
information-sharing among the various state and federal funding programs that are available to towns for
their wastewater projects.
An EPA publication from 2003 discusses the topic of funding coordination at length, arguing that such
coordination makes searching for funding sources simpler, makes review of applications less redundant,
and improves the match between available resources and a project's needs (Handbook 5). This
publication, entitled Handbook on Coordinating Funding for Water and Wastewater Infrastructure, points
out that Vermont's coordination is limited to DEC holding meetings and workshops for engineers regarding
on-going projects and DEC funding options, as well as informal communication with the USDA (Handbook
C-8.). Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to evaluate Vermont's current coordination approach
and make suggestions for how it might be improved, it worth mentioning that if the State is truly committed
to the growth centers concept and to addressing the wastewater barrier to growth center development, the
concept of coordinated funding for wastewater infrastructure should be explored in depth.
Navigating the funding process is not the only challenge small towns face in planning for their wastewater
projects, however. As Carolyn Lowe commented in an article in The American City & County, "from the
largest metropolitan areas to the smallest rural villages, communities of all sizes face the challenge of
providing effective and efficient wastewater treatment...and the challenge is only complicated by
competition for financial resources" (2). In addition, for rural communities with small tax bases, often large
low-income populations, and thus more limited revenue sources, striking a balance between what the
towns want to invest in and what they can afford is even more difficult (Lowe 2). In the third edition of his
textbook on water and wastewater financing, George Raftelis concurs, stating that, "a major challenge
confronting the water and wastewater industries is acquiring adequate funds to finance and operate capital
equipment and facilities and implementing appropriate pricing structures to ensure the self-sufficiency of
the utility" (2). This is especially true as increasing environmental regulations force communities to address
their wastewater capacity issues since "due to economies of scale, increased regulation will impose a
significant burden on small, economically disadvantaged communities" (Raftelis 14). At the same time,
there are examples from around the country where small towns with limited budgets have been able to
"support projects that produce operational, financial, and environmental benefits" (Lowe 2). However,
these successes are likely made possible by strong local support and political will to see them through to
completion.
In general, most property owners would agree that "building and improving public infrastructure...is
necessary to maintain a good quality of life" (Lucero 1). However, as Angelique Lucero points out in an
article from The American City & County, "when it comes to financing these new projects and
improvements, the argument often arises about who will pay for them and how much they will pay" (Lucero
1). Indeed, in Vermont, several projects have been stalled or shelved due to funding constraints as a result
of a combination of a lack of grant funds and opposition on the part of property owners to fees and taxes to
repay debt. Nonetheless, as one participant was noted as stating at the DHCA wastewater steering
committee meeting in February 2007, "there is a high cost at the local level that must be realized [and a]
need to put that fact out there from the start and get people to buy into it"' (Initial Meeting 6). Furthermore,
while some towns try to focus repayment of the project debt on those who directly benefit from the
improved infrastructure, the argument should be made that all residents actually benefit from the project in
terms of improved local water quality and enabling smart growth to occur in their community. Of course
convincing property owners of this is easier said than done. Nonetheless, one way to mitigate community
resistance is by finding ways to reduce the strain on property owners, especially those with lower incomes.
For instance, some commonly used methods include amortizing fees, securing CDBG grants to cover
connection fees for low-income residents, establishing small low-interest revolving loan funds for property
owners, referring residents to USDA loan and grant programs for low-income homeowners, and working
with a local bank to facilitate home improvement loans (Wastewater Feasibility 43 and Raftelis 318-21).
Conclusion
The previous chapter identified wastewater treatment capacity as a barrier to implementing the growth
centers concept in Vermont's unsewered towns. However, addressing this barrier necessitates tackling the
challenges small towns face in financing infrastructure projects to improve their wastewater treatment
capacity to facilitate smart growth. Average wastewater project costs have and will continue to steadily
increase over time. In addition, while federal and state grants and subsidized loans are available, they do
not exist to the same degree as they once did and are thus quite competitive. As a matter of fact,
communities have started to look for grants from agencies that traditionally have not funded water and
sewer projects, such those dedicated to housing, community, and economic development. In addition,
municipalities themselves have had to bear more of the costs of funding wastewater infrastructure costs.
However, while towns with relatively large tax and user bases, as well as relatively high median incomes,
may be able to weather these changes, small towns like those found throughout Vermont are less able to
do so. In fact, the new wastewater infrastructure projects constructed in the last decade in Vermont in
previously unsewered towns were only made possible with significant govemment subsidies in the form of
federal and state grants and earmarks. Indeed, many towns that have not been able to obtain similar levels
of subsidies have had to shelve their wastewater projects as property owners are unable and/or unwilling to
bear a greater share of project costs. In an effort to address this resistance of property owners to tax hikes
to pay for the local share of wastewater projects, Vermonters are have been investigating the possibility of
using tax-increment financing to generate revenue at the local level. In fact, the Vermont Forum on Sprawl
supported an overhaul of Vermont's TIF program in 2006 specifically so that it would open up an additional
source of revenue for infrastructure projects in Vermont's growth centers. However, it has yet to be
determined whether TIF is a viable option for the communities struggling to implement wastewater projects,
and so the following chapter starts to shed some light on practicality of this alternative. In the meantime, it
is important to note that whether TIF ends up working for some communities or not, if Vermont wants to
facilitate the growth centers concept being implemented in unsewered towns, it will also have to grapple
with the issues related to financing small community wastewater projects raised in this chapter, including a
lack of a smart growth component in the Municipal Pollution Control Priority System, inequities related to
federal and state earmarks, as well as multi-year grant commitments, decreasing capital availability from
the CWSRF, limited federal and state wastewater funding coordination, and insufficient understanding at
the local level of financing realities and funding options.
Chapter 4
USING TIF FOR VERMONT GROWTH CENTER WASTEWATER PROJECTS
In the previous chapter, I discussed several ways towns can repay debt issued for a growth center
wastewater project, including an increase in municipal property taxes, special taxes levied on properties
directly benefiting from the investment, and a variety of connection and user fees. However, as grant funds
have become harder to obtain, and towns are faced with having to finance a greater share of project costs
with debt, Vermonters have been looking for additional revenue-generating mechanisms, such as tax-
increment financing (TIF). As mentioned earlier in this thesis, to use TIF for this purpose, a town would
create a TIF district encompassing its growth center and then, during a period of twenty years, divert any
new property tax revenue generated in that district to meet its infrastructure debt obligations. In a recent
article in Planning, James Krohe presented an effective analogy for this process -"tax increment financing
subsidies are like a development credit card for the city: buy a project now and pay it off with future
revenue" (20). As such, TIF has been used extensively in the United States, especially in California and
the Midwest, and it is seen by proponents as providing "manna for cash-starved cities" (Weber 1).
However, like Krohe points out, "as anyone who has a credit card knows, the temptation to misuse it can be
strong" (20). In fact, in his thesis examining the viability of using TIF to trigger redevelopment in Montreal,
Thomas Reiner asserts that "tax increment financing is not suitable for every city. It is not universally a
good development tool. Whether or not it can be beneficially applied in a particular city depends on a
number of factors - such as economic conditions, the number of local taxing jurisdictions, and the local
political climate" (5). Although TIF has only been utilized by a few Vermont communities to date, more
towns are starting to explore the possibility of using it to finance new infrastructure investments in their
growth centers, and thus this chapter aims to familiarize the reader with the TIF concept and to discuss why
TIF may or may not be a reasonable method for generating revenue for growth center wastewater projects.
History and Premise of TIF
The State of California pioneered the concept of tax-increment financing in the early 1950s as a "creative
way to provide matching funds for Federal grant programs" (Weber 1). Although not wildly popular in other
states at that time, with decreasing federal funding for urban renewal in the 1970s and public resistance to
tax rate increases, more and more states began to tum to TIF as an altemative funding source for
economic development initiatives (Donaghy et al. 305; Reiner 23-4; Johnson and Man 31). Over time, an
increasing number of states have permitted the use of TIF, and today forty-nine states4 and the District of
Columbia enable its use, although not all states use this financing tool to the same degree (TIF Resource).
For example, a Bank of America report from 2006 showed that from January 2005 through October 2006,
new TIF districts were initiated in twenty-eight states, with the majority of new districts created in California,
Minnesota, Missouri, Indiana, and Illinois. However, while it has been demonstrated that many
communities have successfully used TIF to spur private development, critics argue that "what began as a
tool to heal blighted downtowns or factory sites became a tool to heal blighted municipal budgets" (Krohe
23). In fact, Krohe indicates that "even TIF advocates...concede that TIF has been overused in the past
decade. In every state in which this tool is widely used, there are efforts to reform the practice..., mainly by
building more rigorous standards and more vigorous oversight into the process" (Krohe 23).
Much of the literature dedicated to TIF discusses its traditional use in funding "project-related economic
development and redevelopment expenditures," such as land acquisition, demolition, and provision of
utilities, sidewalks, or streets (Johnson and Man 84). In such cases, TIF is seen as a way to pay for site
improvements that stimulate development on specific properties or areas that are neglected due to market
failures. As a matter of fact, many states that enable the use of TIF for this purpose employ a 'but-for'
rule5 in approving TIF districts (Johnson and Man 34). However, as a TIF guide for Wisconsin mentions,
"what was once a tool specifically created for urban redevelopment is now used to fund nearly every kind of
development on all types of land" (Maryl 2). For example, some states allow the use of TIF to attract
development to non-blighted areas, or as in Vermont, to encourage development in growth centers. In
addition, TIF has come to be "used to fund physical infrastructure projects traditionally undertaken by
general governments" (Johnson and Man 84). Whether and how a municipality uses TIF is dependent
upon many factors, as Joyce Man concludes in a 1999 article, such as fiscal pressure, adoption of TIF
programs by neighboring cities, other existing economic development programs, industrial composition,
and expected gains in property values from the investments financed by tax increments (1152, 1164-65).
Regardless of why or how a community utilizes TIF, the concept is based on the fact that a public
investment, such as a public wastewater system, parking garage, or roads, will not only increase the value
of existing properties in a specific geographic area, but it will also make land more attractive for new
34Arizona is the only state that does not currently permit the use of TIF, but it did enable TIF at one time.
35This rule basically requires the answer 'no' to the question, "but for the use of tax increment financing, will development occur
in the area?" (Reiner 31)
development, thereby increasing the price of land and the amount of property taxes generated from those
properties. Thus, these increased tax revenues are diverted to repay the debt issued to make the
improvements, arguably placing much of the burden of financing growth on the beneficiaries themselves
and not the community as a whole. The gist of this financing mechanism is that once a municipality
establishes a TIF district, property tax revenue generated within the district is 'frozen' at the current level for
the life of the district, usually around twenty years. This base level of tax revenue continues to be allocated
as it always has - for schools, roads, and any other items in the municipal budget. However, any additional
tax revenue, or tax increment, that is collected above that base level is set aside and used to repay the
bonds or loans obtained to cover the capital costs of the public investment in the district. Once the bonds
or loans are retired, all tax revenue from the district is allocated to the original taxing authorities, and the
TIF district dissolves. As an alternative, TIF revenue can be invested as it is collected, a method known as
'pay as you go.' However, for major infrastructure investments such as a public wastewater system, this
option is not feasible given the up-front capital costs associated with such a project and the fact that the
investment is intended to spur the development which will later create the increments. Another option is for
a developer to fund the infrastructure investment and be repaid with TIF revenue, but this option is more
feasible for expanding existing systems for particular developments rather than for a small community's
initial wastewater infrastructure project.
TIF in the Vermont Context
The process for creating a TIF district is fairly comparable in all states36 (Grueling 210), and according to
the Vermont Economic Progress Council (VEPC)37, the process and criteria for establishing a TIF district in
Vermont was similar to other states when the use of TIF was first enabled in Vermont statute in 1985. The
cities of Burlington and Newport were the only municipalities to use TIF in the early years, and in those
instances TIF was utilized in the traditional manner of financing site improvements to attract development to
a blighted area or to make a parcel more inviting in an effort to facilitate job growth. For example,
Burlington began the process of creating a TIF district in 1995 for the purpose of encouraging
redevelopment along the Lake Champlain waterfront, and the City invested in a parking garage and other
improvements to the area once the district became effective in 1997. The City of Newport, on the other
hand, created a TIF district in 1997 to finance the extension of a water line from the neighboring town of
36See pp. 31-54 in Tax Increment Financing and Economic Development, edited by Johnson and Man, for a description of theprocess for creating a TIF district in most states. The process in Vermont is detailed later in this chapter.37VEPC oversees the approval process for some of Vermont's economic and community development programs. Beginning inJanuary 2009, VEPC will cease to exist and responsibilities will be transferred to an Economic Incentives Review Board (EIRB).
Derby to improve the attractiveness of its industrial park. However, due in part to its lack of utility as well as
other state policy changes, statutory modifications were made to Vermont's TIF legislation 1998 and 2006,
and now the TIF program in Vermont is distinct from other states.
In 1997, Vermont implemented a statewide property tax to fund education38, and the TIF statute was thus
altered to allow for the use of state property tax revenue in addition to municipal property tax revenue for
TIF districts. However, approval for using the incremental education funds was tied to the State's
Economic Advancement Tax Incentive program. Therefore, if a municipality wished to include the state tax
revenues in its TIF plans, authorization had to be granted by VEPC according to the same guidelines that
were used in approving state tax incentives, such as the creation of new jobs, a cost-benefit analysis, and a
'but for' test. Given the type of cost-benefit analysis used to approve TIF districts under the VEPC
guidelines, a TIF district would have to generate sufficient private capital investment and new, well-paying,
full-time jobs to offset the loss in education funds from a TIF district. As per VEPC, demonstrating a net
benefit was quite difficult for mixed-use developments, projected development without a specific business
in mind, or projects where less quantifiable benefits might be realized, such as enabling development in
growth centers or redevelopment of a brownfield. The VEPC guidelines also stipulated that the use of state
property taxes was conditioned on an annual review of job creation and private investment, making
securing debt very difficult as the revenue stream was even more uncertain that is normally the case with
TIF. In addition, with a ten-year limit on the diversion of incremental tax revenue, TIF was really only a
viable option when development in the TIF district was guaranteed to happen very soon after the district
was established. Moreover, given that debt issued for public infrastructure projects generally has a twenty-
year term for repayment, the ten-year restriction made obtaining debt likewise difficult. In fact, the Town of
Milton, whose TIF district took effect in 1999 to pay for an upgrade to the town's sewer system and roads to
accommodate the proposed expansion of a manufacturing plant, was the only municipality to establish a
TIF district between 1998 and 2006 under the statutory requirements. While the City of Winooski was able
to create a TIF district in 2001 to finance a parking garage for a mixed-use mill redevelopment project, the
town had to seek special legislative approval to extend the life of the TIF district and for benefits other than
job creation to be considered in the approval process. In addition, Burlington received approval to create a
38 The legislature passed Act 60, the Equal Educational Opportunity Act, after the State's Supreme Court determined that the
existing educational funding system was unconstitutional because it did not provide equal access to education for all students
(Laws and Requlations). For an explanation of how the statewide property tax is calculated, please refer to information on the
Department of Taxes website at http://www.state.vt.us/tax/pvr.shtml.
TIF district in its South End in 2001, but the district was dissolved before any improvements were made to
the area, due in part to the cumbersome nature of the annual job and investment review. As a result of
these and other issues, Vermonters realized that the constraints of the TIF program needed to be
addressed to facilitate the use of TIF by more municipalities.
According to staff at both VEPC and the Vermont Forum on Sprawl (VFOS), the motivation for the 2006
legislative amendment to the TIF statute came from several fronts. First, Vermonters were worried about
the effect on the State's education fund if towns continued to be allowed to use 100% of the incremental
state property tax for TIF. Second, there was growing pressure from towns looking to establish TIF districts
and a fear among legislators that if changes were not made to the TIF statute to create a less cumbersome
process, more Winooski-type legislative exceptions would be sought. Third, there was growing recognition
among state officials that community development, smart growth, improved quality of life, and a broader
property tax base can be as or more beneficial to the state than new jobs alone. Finally, with the legislature
debating the State's growth centers program during the 2005-2006 session, anti-sprawl advocates were
realizing that not enough revenue sources exist to enable the kind of infrastructure development needed for
successful growth centers. In fact, VFOS saw TIF as a new revenue-generating tool that could help towns
invest in sewer and water systems, structured parking, and sidewalks to help facilitate the kind of mixed-
use, high-density development needed to implement the growth centers concept in many towns across the
state. As part of Act 184, numerous changes39 were made to Vermont's TIF statute in 2006 to address
these issues, including the following:
* Broadening the rationale40 and approval criteria for TIF
* Increasing the allowable term of TIF districts from ten to twenty years
* Restricting the percentage of state property tax allocated for debt repayment and stipulating that
the municipal tax revenue contribution must equal or exceed that of the State
* Requiring readjustment of the original tax base if more than twenty percent of properties in the
municipality are reappraised
39 To see all changes made to the statute, refer to a simplified version of Act 184 at http:ll//www.thinkvermont.com/vepc/htmVl
documents/Statutepostedonweb.pdf.
40 The purpose of a TIF district as stated in Act 184 is "to provide revenues for improvements, located wholly or partly within the
district and related costs, which will stimulate development or redevelopment within the district, provide for employment
opportunities, improve and broaden the tax base, or enhance the general economic vitality of the municipality, the region, or the
state" (Vermont). There are additional proposed changes to the wording of this purpose statement in the House and Senate bills
related to TIF introduced during the 2006-2007 session.
Limiting the number of TIF district approvals over a five-year period to ten overall and no more than
one per municipality
Despite making the use of TIF more feasible for Vermont communities, however, there have been no new
TIF applications to date. Nonetheless, as stated by VEPC, many towns are currently focusing their energy
on preparing the extensive growth center program applications before creating TIF districts to help channel
development into those targeted areas. In addition, municipalities are hoping that the tax increment
financing bill introduced by the Senate this year (S.0191) will pass during the 2006-2007 legislative session
and will iron out some of the kinks in the TIF program that the 2006 legislative amendment inadvertently
created. These proposed changes include the following:
* Pushing back the start date of the five-year period authorizing approval of TIF districts to 2007
* Clarifying the type of debt allowed so that towns may use TIF for repayment of bonds, commercial
loans, or state and federal loans
* Removing the rule that infrastructure investments have to be located in the TIF district and
establishing a proportionality or nexus test to determine the portion of costs to be covered by TIF
* Redesigning the reappraisal formula41 to be based on changes in the education grand list in the
district instead of the town as a whole
* Adding reporting requirements
* Clarifying the time frame for the life of a TIF district and for incurring debt
* Allowing all tax revenue increments in excess of debt obligations to be used to prepay debt or put
into an escrow account, in addition to the option of redistribution to taxing authorities
Although at the time of the writing of this thesis, S.0191 had only passed in the Senate and H.0509 was just
being introduced in the House, according to VEPC, there is no significant opposition to the contents of the
bill, and thus it is likely to pass in both chambers. Given the short life span of the new TIF program in
Vermont, however, only time will tell as to the efficacy of the regulations and the impact of this financial tool
on growth center planning in Vermont.
41 For the proposed formula, the numerator is the reassessed education grand list in the TIF district and the denominator is the
previous year's education grand list in the district, as long as the education property tax revenue in the district is greater following
reappraisal.
Process for Creating a TIF District in Vermont
As the VEPC website states, the approval process for establishing a TIF district in Vermont is designed to
ensure public involvement and that municipal and state tax revenue is used in an appropriate manner for
facilitating certain desired public-good benefits (TIF District Program). While the process may require fewer
approvals if a municipality does not wish to use state tax revenue, the requirements described in the TIF
statute must still be followed and thus the five-step process outlined by VEPC is a good guide42.
First, a municipality needs to initiate the establishment of a TIF district by involving decision-makers,
completing an initial financial feasibility analysis, and determining whether the district serves the purposes
outlined in the statute and that projected development in the district is compatible with local and regional
plans. A town often contracts with a consultant to assist with this and the following step, formulating a
redevelopment plan. For this step, the municipality outlines the objectives of the district, determines the
boundary of the district, estimates the infrastructure project timelines and costs, the original tax base and
projected revenue increments, establishes evaluation procedures, and settles on likely debt financing
policies. The next step involves securing local and state approvals. At the local level, the municipality must
enact any zoning or other changes necessary for implementing the TIF district, hold public hearings and a
vote on the proposed TIF plan, and designate a coordinating agency, if desired. If the town wishes to use
state tax revenues, it must then submit an application to VEPC.
As part of its approval process, VEPC determines whether the application meets the 'but for' and other
process requirements, as well as the location and project goal criteria. It is important to note that if a TIF
district is located within a designated growth center, it is deemed to have complied with the 'but for'
requirement because most municipalities would not otherwise be able to use TIF in growth centers. As to
the location criteria, the district must be in an approved growth center, downtown, village center, or new
town center, or development must be compact and high-density and in or near existing industrial areas, or
in an economically distressed area43. For the project criteria, the district must meet three of the following
five requirements:
42 For a complete description of the process for creating a TIF district in Vermont, refer to the VEPC document at
http://www.thinkvermont.com/vepc/htmVdocuments/CreatingaTIFDistrictinVT.pdf.
43 There is an additional location criterion of compact, high-density development in or near existing residential or commercial
areas, but is not effective after 2008.
* Substantial public investment over and above the normal municipal operating or bonded debt
expenditures is needed
* Development includes housing that is affordable to the majority of the town's residents and
developed at higher density than existing housing stock
* Affects cleanup and redevelopment of a brownfield
* Development includes at least one new business, business operation, or business expansion,
providing new, quality, full-time jobs that meet or exceed the prevailing wage for the region
* Enhances transportation by creating improved traffic patterns and flow or creating or improving
public transportation systems
When the TIF district has been approved at the local and state level, the municipality then has to seek
approval from voters to bond for the TIF district infrastructure improvements because, according to the TIF
statute, the municipality must pledge its credit for any TIF debt". Once approved, the town has up to five
years to incur debt, the infrastructure construction and redevelopment occurs, the town complies with
reporting requirements, and the debt is repaid over the twenty-year period. Finally, the TIF district is
evaluated based on the procedures outlined in the TIF plan, and once all debt has been repaid, the district
is dissolved.
Although this process may seem fairly straightforward in theory, it is not as easy to navigate in reality, in
Vermont or elsewhere. As Robert Sabbatini wrote back in 1978, "although the concept of TIF may appear
simple, the implementation can be complex and treacherous. Each state's legislation differs, recognizing
certain flaws in the basic concept, correcting some, and creating others" (ii). Furthermore, in Vermont,
many municipalities lack professional economic development and planning staff, and the responsibility for
working on planning-related projects often falls to some combination of volunteers and consultants. Thus,
for TIF to be feasible for small Vermont communities, the State will likely need to provide guidance in
navigating the process, from an initial evaluation of the pros and cons associated with using this financing
mechanism to the actual preparation of an application and later implementation.
44 This requirement for double barrel bonds essentially means that if the tax increment is insufficient to pay the principal and
interest on debt in any year for any reason, the municipality must repay the debt from other sources. I discuss the pros and cons
of this approach later in the chapter.
Benefits and Drawbacks of TIF
Much has been written on the topic of pros and cons of TIF in general, because as James Andrews writes,
"criticism [of TIF] has gone on ever since California wrote tax increment financing into its constitution in
1952" (2). Indeed, as Rachel Weber states, "the more cities rely on TIF, the more the tool has come under
scrutiny" (1). However, it is important to note that some of the disadvantages cited in the literature, such as
favoritism to specific developers and lenient 'but for' rules, do not necessarily apply to growth center
infrastructure projects in Vermont. Other frequently mentioned drawbacks to TIF, such as a lack of citizen
participation and overlapping taxing jurisdictions not being included in the approval process, have been
mitigated by Vermont's statutory regulations. On the other hand, some of the TIF program characteristics
and statutory limitations specific to Vermont may mitigate some of the often cited benefits, such as
removing the burden of payment from the general tax base and exemptions from debt limits, voter
referendums, and state approval. This is not to say that there are no benefits to using TIF for a growth
center wastewater project but rather that it is imperative that Vermont communities evaluate the
advantages and disadvantages of utilizing TIF in this context, as discussed in the remainder of this section.
John Petersen mentioned in an article from 2000 in Governing that the concept of value capture45 is getting
special attention, especially for "small towns and hinterland locations that have begun to grow like topsy
and to experience congested roads and a demand for more sophisticated, city-like services" (1). This
statement suggests that the use of TIF is not necessarily limited to large cities and may in fact be an
appropriate financing mechanism for new municipal infrastructure, such as sewer, in high growth areas.
Therefore, the idea of using TIF to help pay for infrastructure investments in Vermont growth centers,
where a majority of a town's new and most valuable development should occur in the future, seems
plausible. In addition, as one Vermonter I interviewed stated, "sewer drives development in Vermont," and
so wastewater infrastructure is the kind of investment that lends itself to generating increased property
values, an outcome key to the successful use of TIF. Furthermore, in Vermont, the local share of
wastewater infrastructure debt tends to be repaid with some combination of fees and municipal property
taxes. However, because TIF districts can capture both municipal and state property taxes, TIF may be an
attractive alternative to simply raising the municipal property tax rate to cover the local share of a
wastewater project. In the article referenced above, Petersen points out that TIFs solve two problems for
growing communities - the need to make public investments to facilitate wanted development and a desire
45 Value capture is another name for the TIF concept.
to place the burden of paying for these investments on the primary beneficiaries and not the existing
property owners (1). Indeed, it is possible that in Vermont the use of TIF may be a more politically
agreeable way to facilitate wastewater infrastructure investments that will enable growth center
development than raising property taxes. However, in the case of wastewater infrastructure in a growth
center that will likely improve water quality in the region and enable smart growth, the beneficiaries are not
only those who receive the sewer services. In addition, due to the municipal credit pledge required by
statute, the burden of paying for the investment is not fully shifted to just the property owners benefiting
from the sewer service. Therefore, using TIF to help pay for a growth center wastewater project should
work in theory, and employing it as an alternative to a municipal tax increase may move a project forward.
However, it is not necessarily the most appropriate revenue-generating option in this context, not to
mention that TIF may not actually be feasible in some small towns in Vermont, as discussed next.
Generating Tax Increments
Whether a TIF district is likely to generate sufficient tax increments to cover the debt payments for a
particular infrastructure project depends on several traits of the town and the TIF district. In a recent article
from Planning, James Krohe stresses that "most cities surveyed in recent years confirm that property
values in their TIF districts increased as promised...However, underlying economic factors common to all
development projects - location, markets, local prosperity, and the like - must be as sound in TIF-assisted
project as in any other, perhaps more so" (23). This is a particularly important issue for small,
predominantly rural Vermont communities looking to invest in wastewater infrastructure.
As Petersen points out, small towns, especially those with substantial agricultural land, may not have a
large enough tax base or high enough tax rates on which to generate adequate increments (2). Staff at
Vermont's Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) echo this point, stating that the tax revenue
generated in many towns is relatively small anyway, and so unless a town foresees substantial new
development, any increment within a TIF district would represent a small percentage of a small tax base
and may not amount to enough to cover even part of a bond or loan repayment. In addition, if a town's
budget does not increase substantially with new development but assessed values rise significantly and the
town reduces its tax rate annually based on the budget and assessed values, then the ability to capture
sufficient tax increments within the TIF district is diminished. Finally, if a town has a lot of land in its TIF
district that is owned by public or non-profit entities or has abated taxes as an incentive to attract
businesses, the ability to generate tax increments in the district is likewise weakened.
The quantity of vacant or underdeveloped land, strength of the real estate market, and potential for high-
value new development within the TIF district also influence a town's ability to attain sufficient tax
increments for debt repayment. As mentioned earlier, tax increments are captured from routine property
appreciation, improvements to existing properties, redevelopment, and new development. However, as
Weber asserts, districts with a great deal of underutilized land and not very tight real estate markets are not
likely to see large increases in property values even with new development (6, 10). Another important
consideration regarding increments is that in Vermont, the base level of taxes in a TIF district is not frozen
for the life of the district but rather it is adjusted every time more than twenty percent of the properties in the
town are reappraised. Therefore, the most valuable tax increments will come from significant new
development, redevelopment, and improvements to existing properties and not from ordinary property
value appreciation. Nevertheless, Robert Sabbatini maintains that "the experience of municipalities
indicates that rehabilitation and restoration cannot solely generate sufficient tax increments," and so
considerable new development is actually the most important factor in creating ample tax increments within
the TIF district (11). Indeed, the March 2007 issue of Planning highlighted Greenville, South Carolina's
experience with its three TIF districts and points out that two of the three districts were not as successful as
the other given that they "took longer to create capital because there was no development to spur
growth...in order to work, you almost have to anticipate the new development" (Boyanoski 22). The type of
new development is also a factor in generating adequate tax increments. For example, if a district has the
potential to attract high-density commercial and industrial uses and high-income residential uses, it will be
more likely to see steeper increases in property values (Weber 6 and Sabbatini 10). The ability of a town to
attract this type of new development depends on several factors, though, including zoning regulations,
quality of life, transportation access, availability of infrastructure and telecommunications, talented work
force, housing stock, quality of schools, and land conditions within the district. More importantly, it depends
on a town's willingness to address any barriers within its control that may affect such development.
In the early stages of a TIF feasibility analysis, towns must consider whether the community and proposed
TIF district have the traits necessary to generate sufficient tax increments to finance part or all of a
wastewater infrastructure project and if not, if measures can be taken at the local level to better position the
district to create such increments. To make this determination, towns must first know what their expected
annual debt payments will be for the wastewater project and the magnitude of property value increases
within the district that would be necessary, given expected tax rates, to make those debt payments. The
following 'back of the envelope' calculations and discussion are therefore designed to give the reader a
sense of the magnitude of property value increases that would have to occur in Vermont growth center TIF
districts to make the likely debt payments for a wastewater project. However, it is important to note that
while I have endeavored to make my assumptions as realistic as possible, based on my knowledge of
wastewater funding in Vermont, TIF regulations, and property taxation, the scenario I created is intended to
highlight issues that towns will need to consider in conducting their own TIF feasibility analysis and thus
should not be taken too literally.
The towns selected for this exercise are the six Vermont communities that, as of August 2006, had or were
in the process of completing wastewater infrastructure feasibility studies. While not a scientifically
representative sample of unsewered Vermont towns, these communities are scattered throughout the state
and embody an array of tax bases, tax rates, and homestead versus non-residential makeup46. For this
exercise, I calculated annual debt payments based on loan amounts ranging from $1 million to $5 million,
and I assumed that the debt source is the Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF), with loan terms of
20 years at 2% with principle payments deferred for the first five years. In addition, I assumed that only
75% percent of both municipal and state tax increments are captured to make annual debt payments. To
simplify the tax calculations, I used weighted average total tax rates from 2006, based on the percentage of
homestead and non-residential properties in the town, and I assumed that tax rates are unchanged over
the 20-year period. I should also note that grand list figures come from the 2006 education grand list. All
tax and grand list information was obtained from the Vermont Department of Taxes online reports. Finally, I
have not accounted for any base level adjustments due to reassessment. The discussion below is based
on the following table, showing the calculations for a $3 million loan, and the remaining calculations for the
other loan amounts, which can be found in Appendix B.
46 All properties in Vermont are classified as homestead or non-residential for education property tax purposes.
LOAN AMOUNT: $3 million Years 1 - 5 Year 6
Wtd
Avg Annual Tax GL Annual Tax GL
Tax Education Debt Increment Increase % of Debt Increment Increase % of
Town Rate GL47  Payments Needed Needed GL Payments Needed Needed GL
East
Montpelier 3.1095 $1,519,320 $60,000 $80,000 $25,727 1.69% $260,000 $346,667 $111,485 7.34%
Georgia 1.3340 $4,623,433 $60,000 $80,000 $59,970 1.30% $260,000 $346,667 $259,868 5.62%
Shaftsbury 2.1373 $1,966,088 $60,000 $80,000 $37,431 1.90% $260,000 $346,667 $162,202 8.25%
Waitsfield 1.4330 $3,533,094 $60,000 $80,000 $55,829 1.58% $260,000 $346,667 $241,924 6.85%
Westford 2.1866 $1,509,853 $60,000 $80,000 $36,586 2.42% $260,000 $346,667 $158,539 10.50%
Wolcott 2.3764 $806,640 $60,000 $80,000 $33,664 4.17% $260,000 $346,667 $145,878 18.08%
Based on the series of assumptions listed earlier, for the $3 million loan scenario shown in the table above
a town would have to make annual interest-only debt payments in the amount of $60,000 for the first five
years. As I discuss in more detail later in the chapter, in the early years of a TIF district, there is often little
increment to be captured given the lag time of constructing the infrastructure, as well as the time it takes for
new development to take place. Therefore, although I have calculated the increase in property value that
would be necessary to generate sufficient tax increments to make these interest payments, it is likely that
the debt payments in the first few years would be made with a combination of incremental tax revenue and
other sources. For instance, towns could use the connection or service connection fees that are collected
for the wastewater project to help cover these interest payments. In addition, a town can finance a multi-
year debt service reserve from the original loan proceeds to help make these early payments. For
example, if the local share of the project costs was $2.85 million, the town might take out a loan in the
amount of $3 million and use the excess 150,000 to cover half the interest payments during the first five
years.
Given the assumptions of this debt scenario, the figures for the sixth year are critical year to examine as
that is when a town would make its largest debt payment during the 20-year life of the loan. Beginning in
year seven, annual debt payments begin to decrease as the principle is paid off, so as long as the TIF
district is able to generate sufficient increments to meet the debt obligation in year six, it should also be
able to do so in subsequent years. Of course, any base readjustment, decrease in the assessed value of
properties in the district, or decrease in tax rates would change the situation, but studying the year six
figures alone seems to be satisfactory for this kind of cursory analysis. In the $3 million scenario, the year
47 The grand list (GL) is 1% of the listed value of properties in a town. While the municipal and education grand lists can be
different if a municipality taxes personal property, they tend to be fairly similar.
six debt payment is $260,000. However, given the assumption that only 75% of tax increments can be
captured to make debt payments, a TIF district would actually have to generate $346,667 in tax increments
to meet the debt obligations. I should point out that while a maximum of 75% of the state property tax
increments may be captured for debt repayment, municipalities can elect to capture up to 100% of the
municipal increments, in which case the TIF district would not need to generate as much 'excess' tax
revenue as in this example. At the same time, the scenario I have created is not very conservative since it
does not account for unforeseen decreases in assessed value, lower tax rates, or any required base
adjustments. In fact, although the State does not require a particular debt service coverage ratio48 for its
CWSRF loans, a town might want to impose such a cushion itself to add some conservatism to the
projections, especially since if enough incremental revenue is not generated to cover the debt payments
the town at large is responsible for making up for the shortfall.
In the case of Waitsfield, for example, given the weighted average total tax rate, to generate the $346,667
in increments, there would have to be a $241,924 increase in the grand list within the TIF district, or a
$24,192,400 increased in the listed value of the district's taxable properties. In reality, this figure would be
calculated based on the actual total tax rates for homestead and non-residential properties in the TIF
district itself and not the town as a whole. Therefore, if the TIF district encompasses a growth center where
there tend to be more non-residential uses, it is possible that necessary increase in listed value may be
slightly less than in this example. In the case of Waitsfield, for instance, where over 80% of taxable parcels
in the Irasville growth center are non-residential, the grand list increase would be slightly less than in the
example at $239,356. At the same time, if tax rates fluctuate up or down during the life of the TIF district,
the needed increase would likewise vary. Nevertheless, an initial analysis of this figure would assess the
district's potential to achieve such an increase, based on historic growth rates and projected new
development. For instance, the necessary grand list increase of $241,924 represents a 6.85% increase
over the 2006 grand list for Waitsfield as a whole and a 74% increase of the grand list figures for the growth
center from 2006. Over a six-year period, this averages out to about 1.14% increase in the town's grand
list and a 12% per year increase in the growth center. While this might be attainable depending on the
timing of projected new development and market appreciation, some of that market appreciation will not go
towards the TIF revenue as it will be incorporated into a base readjustment. Therefore, the idea that the
48A debt service coverage ratio (DSCR) measures how revenue compares to the required debt payments. The higher the ratio,
the more cushion there is to make debt payments.
growth center alone, which only represents approximately 9% of the town's overall property values, could
achieve the necessary increase in property values, even with significant new development seems
somewhat questionable. In looking at the $4 million and $5 million loan scenarios, the ability for a TIF
district encompassing the growth center to generate sufficient increments seems even more implausible for
Waitsfield as the required growth in the grand list for the TIF district would be $322,565 and $403,206,
respectively. On the other hand, for a $1 or $2 million loan, it might be more feasible with needed grand list
growth of $161,283 and $80,641, respectively. While it appears that for a town like Waitsfield TIF may not
work for much more than a $2 million loan, for the other towns in this sample scenario, even that might be a
stretch. For instance, the required growth in a TIF district grand list represents a small percentage of
Georgia's overall grand list but in the other four towns, it represents an even greater percentage than in
Waitsfield. Of course, without knowing the particular historical growth rates and projected new
development in the growth centers in these towns and given that these calculations are all very 'back of the
envelope', it is hard to definitively say whether using TIF to repay loans in a range of $1 to $5 million is
feasible. However, the scenarios I created indicate that, especially for the larger loan amounts, TIF seems
to be somewhat of a remote possibility for a growth center wastewater project in these towns.
Predicting Future Development
In the previous section, I talked about the kinds of characteristics that might help or hinder new
development in a TIF district and a range of increased property values a town might have to see in its TIF
district to repay the local share of a wastewater project. However, predictions of whether and when such
increases will actually occur can be quite uncertain. Even when such projections are developed by
professional consultants, there is simply no guarantee that development will occur to the extent predicted or
at all. James Krohe stresses this point, stating that although "flat-out financial failures are rare...[and] many
TIF-backed projects do well enough to at least cover bond expenses, they often fall well short of the
projections of backers" (24). Even if a particular development is in the pipeline when a TIF district is
created and is nearly guaranteed to proceed, circumstances can change and a projected development may
not materialize at all, may be delayed, may be reduced, or may not achieve the forecasted value (Johnson
and Man 24-5). For example, in Milton, Vermont, the Husky plant promised a certain number of jobs and
level of capital investments that did not occur to the extent predicted. Fortunately, the town decided to
phase its infrastructure investments, so the reduced jobs and capital from the manufacturer did not end up
affecting the town's ability to repay the debt with TIF revenue. However, without such safeguards a town
would then be burdened with covering the shortfall.
In addition, the level of economic diversity in a town will affect the TIF district's ability to actually generate
the increments predicted. As one Vermont assessor pointed out, if a town's economy is based on tourism,
and there is no snow or a major downturn in the national economy, the increments envisioned may not
occur. According to him, although many towns in Vermont have seen steady acceleration in property
values over the last twenty years, others have actually seen declines, something that is a continuing
possibility in the future. Similarly, the size of the district and the makeup of the property owners will make
the district more or less vulnerable to unforeseen circumstances. For instance, a TIF district with a high
concentration of the major taxpayers in a town, taxpayers with volatile businesses, or a few owners
controlling a majority of the parcels, will not generate the increments predicted if one or more of those
taxpayers leave the area or are delinquent in paying their taxes.
Other factors influencing actual increments include fluctuating tax rates, statutory modifications to the TIF
program, and assessment appeals. Additionally, in Vermont, the TIF base must be readjusted every time
more than twenty percent of properties in the town are reassessed. Essentially, as staff at VEPC revealed,
instead of freezing the tax base, the town is really freezing the physical presence of the district in the base
year and ensuring district revenues are generated from new development and not just market appreciation.
Although this practice helps reduce the impact of TIF districts on town budgets and the State's education
fund, it makes predicting future increments quite difficult. Nonetheless, while these and other issues pose
on-going difficulties for TIF districts, it is important to note that "where incremental revenue growth has
dangerously underperformed expectations, it is mostly because of poor project planning or state
usurpation" (Johnson and Man 85). Nonetheless, even with proper planning, the uncertainty around future
increments may have repercussions for towns in obtaining the necessary debt for growth center
wastewater infrastructure investments.
TIF Debt
In his article on the use of debt in tax increment financing, Craig Johnson emphasizes that "tax increment
debt finance, by its very nature, is subject to substantial uncertainty and risk. The risks begin prior to the
issuance of TIF debt and last throughout the life of the TIF project, and perhaps beyond" (Johnson and Man
77). The ambiguity around predicting future tax increments mentioned earlier causes this risk and may
result in increasing the cost of the debt for financing wastewater projects, as well as decreasing the amount
of the infrastructure investment that can be covered by such debt. By and large, general obligation debt is
much easier and less costly to float than revenue debt, and given the speculative nature of TIF, the
challenges are even greater than for revenue debt repaid with some type of fee. In some cases, if an
infrastructure investment is made for a particular development, a developer may be willing to enter into an
agreement with the town in case of potential tax increment shortfalls. However, without specific new
development in the pipeline, investors or lenders may charge higher interest rates to mitigate the risk or
require credit enhancements, such as a debt service coverage threshold or a debt service reserve fund to
protect them should TIF revenue not materialize as forecasted. However, these protections result in the
town being able raise less debt for a given stream of expected tax increment.
In Vermont, such risk-mitigation techniques may not be imposed by lenders, however, because the TIF
statute mandates that all TIF debt must be additionally backed by the credit of the town. Unfortunately, if
the increments do not cover the debt repayment, the town as a whole will bear the burden of the debt
repayment, eliminating one of the benefits of using TIF instead of municipal tax revenue. To lessen the
chance that general taxes are raised if TIF revenue does not materialize to the extent predicted, town
residents may vote to impose some kind of risk-mitigation strategy on the TIF district, such as a debt
service coverage threshold and the establishment of a reserve fund. Then, if the district actually generates
more than enough incremental revenue to meet the debt obligations in any given year, the excess revenue
can be used to prepay the debt or be deposited into a debt service reserve fund to cover any future
shortfalls.
Even with the extra security pledge, a lender or investor will still want to see that the TIF projections are
reasonable and that the town is not putting itself at a high risk of having to use its own funds to cover
increment shortfalls. This is especially true if a town carries out the public sale of a bond, as Milton and
Winooski did for their TIF projects, because a town will be rated according to several key credit
characteristics, such as taxpayer concentration, debt service coverage, legal provisions, economic factors,
and sensitivity to assessed value declines (Corson 1). According to the Vermont Municipal Bond Bank
(VMBB), it is more likely that small towns thinking about TIF for a wastewater project in their growth centers
will acquire debt from the Clean Water State Revolving Fund (CWSRF), the USDA Rural Development
Water and Environmental Program, or VMBB's bond pool given the relative ease and lower costs of
obtaining debt from these sources. Due to the recent modifications to the TIF statute and the fact that all
towns considering TIF under the new regulations are still in the feasibility stage, VMBB has yet to
determine how it will treat applications for CWSRF loans or pooled municipal bonds using TIF.
Nonetheless, as indicated by VMBB, given that only ten towns may establish TIF districts in the next five
years and that TIF debt is additionally secured by the town's credit, it is likely that higher interest rates and
additional credit enhancements will not be imposed by the lending entity.
A debt matter that towns will definitely have to address, however, is the mismatch between when increased
tax revenues materialize and when TIF-backed debt must be repaid. Even in the best of circumstances
there is some lag time between when the new wastewater infrastructure can handle increased development
and when that development actually occurs. Furthermore, if there are delays in constructing the
infrastructure, the development lag will be even longer. At the same time, debt service payments start as
soon as the loan or bond is obtained. Thus, towns must find alternative sources of cash flow to make
principal and interest payments in the early years when little or no tax increment is generated. Interest-only
payments in the initial five years may be possible and would alleviate some of the problem, and interest
payments could then be paid with a debt service reserve created with some type of connection fee or
reserves funded as part of the overall project budget.
Equity Issues
Additional concerns that TIF critics raise regarding this financing tool relate to several equity issues. For
example, since the tax increments above the base are set aside to repay the infrastructure debt, any
increased service needs of the property owners within the district or the community as a whole that would
normally be paid for through property taxes in the district must be covered by the rest of the town. For
instance, one of the reasons Greenville, South Carolina gives for not pursuing TIF in the future is that "the
trapping of funds in one district cuts money from the overall budget. You still need to pay for police and fire
and other city services" (Boyanoski 22). However, although it makes predicting future tax increments
difficult, Vermont has been able to address this issue to some degree by requiring a base readjustment
every time more than twenty percent of properties in the town are reassessed.
Another drawback that is often noted is the use of tax revenue that would normally contribute to an
overlapping taxing jurisdiction, such as Vermont's state education fund, to repay debt on an infrastructure
project in one town. In fact, David Wilcox and David Versel maintain that "tax-increment financing works
best in states in which property tax is principally administered by local governments" (6). The literature that
focuses on this issue tends to highlight overlapping taxing jurisdictions within a small sub-section of a state,
such as a county or a regional school district. In these instances, the problem has been tackled by
including all affected municipalities in the TIF district approval process and reducing the percentage of tax
increments that can be diverted to repay TIF debt (Weber 10). While the former is not really feasible given
that the education fund in Vermont is statewide, the 2006 legislative changes did reduce the affect of TIF
districts on the education fund by limiting the amount of state tax increments that can be used for debt
repayment, mandating that the percentage of municipal tax increments used meet or exceed the
percentage of state tax increments, stipulating a base readjustment, and restricting the number of TIFs in
the next five years to ten statewide and one per municipality.
Conclusion
As mentioned throughout this thesis, wastewater infrastructure projects in small Vermont towns can be
quite expensive, relative to the tax base and income levels of the community, even when a town obtains
grant funds to cover a majority of the costs. Given the increased competition for grants, it is no surprise
that towns are looking for alternative ways to cover the local share of growth center wastewater projects.
As it stands now, towns can repay debt for these projects using a combination of fees, special taxes in the
service area, or municipal property tax revenue. Based on the experience of towns that have completed
wastewater projects in recent years, it seems that the selection of one or more of these options depends on
ability of project proponents to generate broad-based support by demonstrating that the new infrastructure
will benefit all property owners and not just those receiving the sewer service. In towns that have been
unable to generate such support, electing to place the burden of repayment on direct beneficiaries alone
has meant, in some cases, that the project cannot move forward as there is a point at which fees and
special taxes in the service area become unaffordable. In theory at least, TIF is a way to keep the burden
of repayment on the direct beneficiaries without increasing taxes. However, while choosing TIF over one of
the other alternatives may be more politically feasible, in the Vermont context, it does not seem to be the
most appropriate or practical way to resolve the financial barrier towns face in improving their wastewater
treatment capacity.
First, while it may seem that using TIF puts the burden of repayment on direct beneficiaries of the
investment, due to the additional security pledge from the town required by statute, all property owners are
actually responsible for repayment. In fact, one of the key benefits cited in the literature for using TIF is the
fact that it does not put taxpayers at risk, and so this provision in Vermont removes one of the primary
benefits of using TIF. It is true that the likelihood of an increment shortfall can be mitigated with
conservative projections and debt reserve funds, but such measures only reduce the facility of using this
financing tool. In addition, taxpayers in the rest of the town are burdened in other ways, such as having to
bear more of the costs of increased service needs in the TIF district and the community as a whole that
would normally be shared with the tax payers in the growth center. Second, one could argue that, it is not
appropriate to shift the burden of repayment entirely onto direct beneficiaries. A growth center wastewater
project by its very nature benefits more than just those connected to the sewer service. Not only is water
quality likely to improve, but as discussed at length in the second chapter of this thesis, all residents will
benefit from development being able to occur in a growth center as opposed to scattered throughout the
community. On the other hand, the benefits of improved water quality and smart growth will be
experienced at a regional and state level, so in using state tax revenue to partially repay the infrastructure
debt, TIF may be an appropriate way to spread the burden statewide.
Aside from whether TIF achieves the desire of a town to put the burden of debt repayment on direct
beneficiaries or whether it is an appropriate financing tool for a growth center wastewater project, the
market and taxation realities of some towns and the extensive process for establishing a TIF district may
make using TIF simply infeasible for a small community wastewater project. Earlier in this chapter, I
discussed the conditions under which a TIF district is likely to generate sufficient increments to cover
wastewater infrastructure debt obligations. However, few unsewered Vermont towns are likely to meet
these conditions. For instance, a cursory analysis of six unsewered communities in the example beginning
on page fifty-six indicates that to generate the level of incremental revenue needed to make debt payments
on loans in the range of $1 to $5 million would require considerable gains in a TIF district's grand list, so
sizeable in most cases that it is fairly implausible, especially for loans above $2 million. For such a
relatively small loan amount, it is questionable whether the hurdles a town would have to go through to
create the TIF district are really worth it.
Although one of the reasons given for making Vermont's TIF statute more flexible in recent years was to
enable its use for growth center investments, including wastewater infrastructure, the State is clearly
conflicted over enabling improved access to this financing tool. In fact, the State has imposed numerous
safeguards, including an extensive approval and reporting process, additional credit pledges, and base
readjustment, that will result in adding to overall project costs. While these requirements were likely
intended to address many of the often cited negative attributes of TIF, they seem to constrain its use so
much that TIF may not actually be any more feasible for Vermont's unsewerd towns.
In the preceding chapter I concluded that while there are some ways the State can smooth the progress of
growth center wastewater projects, if an unsewered town wants to improve water quality and enable smart
growth, the reality is that some or all residents are going to have to cover a share of project costs. It is
possible that for towns that are already preparing the extensive growth center designation application and
that have adequate professional support, strong potential for new development, realistic projections, and
safeguards against increments that do not materialize to the extent predicted, TIF may be a viable option
for financing at least part of its growth center wastewater infrastructure investment. However, given the
costs of creating and managing a TIF district in Vermont and the relatively small quantities of debt most
unsewered towns will be able to obtain for a projected stream of incremental tax revenue, TIF is probably
not the most valuable financing tool for Vermont's small towns. Nevertheless, before dismissing TIF
entirely, it is worth comparing the use of TIF to other sources of revenue in the context of a particular
wastewater project. Therefore, in the next chapter, I explore the feasibility of using TIF for the growth
center wastewater project in the town of Waitsfield, Vermont.
Chapter 5
CASE STUDY - WAITSFIELD, VERMONT
In the previous chapter, I began to analyze the possibility of using TIF to partially fund Vermont growth
center wastewater projects. In this chapter, I aim to deepen that analysis by examining the viability of using
TIF to partially fund a specific wastewater project in Waitsfield, Vermont. It is true that the town of
Waitsfield, its Irasville growth center, and its proposed wastewater infrastructure project are unique in many
ways. Nevertheless, by applying some of the principles discussed in the prior chapter, this case study is
intended to give the reader a more concrete idea of the issues a town needs to investigate and address
during the initial stages of a TIF feasibility analysis. Thus, as with all case studies, while based in an
explicit example, it should offer general lessons for other unsewered towns in Vermont considering using
TIF for their growth center wastewater projects.
Town of Waitsfield
Located in central Vermont in Washington County, Waitsfield lies southwest of Vermont's capital in
Montpelier, approximately a thirty-minute drive away. The town's main street is Route 100, which runs
through the Green Mountains and provides access to Interstate 89. Along with the neighboring
communities of Fayston, Warren, and Moretown49, Waitsfield is considered part of the Mad River Valley
(MRV). The town is approximately thirty square miles and is comprised in large part by forest, agricultural
land, and open space. While residences are scattered throughout the town, most of the commercial and
civic life of Waitsfield is concentrated in Waitsfield Village, Irasville, and the Mad River [Industrial] Park.
As of the 2000 Census, there were 1,659 residents in Waitsfield, up 16.7% over the previous decade. A
2002 study conducted by Economic & Policy Resources, Inc. (EPR) developed status quo population and
household projections for the next twenty years, predicting that during that period Waitsfield's population
will grow at 1.5% per year, totaling 591 new residents and 262 households, or 23% of the predicted
population growth in the MRV. According to Waitsfield's 2005 town plan, its residents are, as compared to
the county and state, somewhat older, less native to Vermont, more formally educated, wealthier, less
impoverished, and similarly lacking in ethnic diversity. As of 2000, the median income of residents was
49 Waitsfield is also bordered by Northfield, but Northfield is not considered part of the Mad River Valley
$45,577, 12% higher than the state median, and in 2006, the median price of primary residences sold was
$268,000, as compared to the state median of $197,000.
Like many other towns in Vermont, Waitsfield's economy was once predominantly based in agriculture and
forestry, but according to the 2005 town plan, only twelve active farms exist currently. With the opening of
the Mad River Glen and Sugarbush ski areas in the 1940s and 50s, tourism began to play a much larger
role in the local economy. Indeed, given plentiful year-round recreational activities in the MRV, tourism is
the dominant industry in the area, and the temporary population in the MRV can reach 13,000 in peak
tourist season. Nonetheless, although Waitsfield is a tourist destination and 59% of jobs are in the service
and retail industries, it has managed to develop a diverse economic base for its size and rural character.
Due in part to its access to advanced telecommunications from the Waitsfield Telecommunications
Company and being home to the MRV's only industrial park, Waitsfield has developed into the commercial
hub for the MRV. In fact, the 2002 EPR study identified Waitsfield as a net importer of jobs with 191
employers, not including sole proprietors. The same study mentioned that 336 new jobs were created in
Waitsfield in the last decade, representing 90% of the new job growth in the MRV for that period. However,
a majority of employers are in the service and retail industries. The EPR study concludes that despite this,
given the area's high quality of life, current demographic profile, presence of advanced communications
infrastructure, and educated local labor force, the MRV is well positioned to adapt to and take advantage of
economic changes. The EPR study predicts that, based on status quo policies and assuming no
infrastructure constraints, in the next twenty years, 399 new non-farm jobs will be created in Waitsfield,
representing 43% of projected job growth for the MRV. Of the jobs in Waitsfield, 41% will be in the service
sector, followed by the manufacturing, transportation/public utilities, and wholesale sectors. To do so,
however, EPR wams that Waitsfield needs to protect its natural assets, utilize its high technology
infrastructure, and focus on niche markets, such as specialty foods and engineering/architecturavbusiness
management services that do not compete on price. The report also advises that Waitsfield address
several weaknesses and constraints, including a difficult and unpredictable regulatory process, lack of
night-time and non-recreational entertainment, and transportation issues around walking and biking. The
most significant barrier to economic development in Waitsfield, though, is a lack of municipal water and
sewer, which also contributes to its other principle weak points of housing and labor shortages.
As mentioned earlier, one of Waitsfield's greatest attractions for tourists, residents, and employers alike is
its natural beauty and recreational opportunities. Yet, as discussed previously in this thesis, a lack of
publicly managed wastewater treatment can lead to the contamination of ground and surface water, making
the area less attractive. In addition, insufficient wastewater treatment capacity prevents the town from
preserving its traditional settlement pattern, an aesthetic resource that, if destroyed, may discourage people
from moving to or visiting the area. Finally, inadequate wastewater treatment capacity impedes the
development of affordable housing, which often comes in the form of high-density, multi-family structures,
and is thus a barrier to maintaining and attracting a sufficient labor force.
Irasville Growth Center
The approximately 195 acres on eighty-six parcels that comprise the Irasville area of Waitsfield extend
north to south along Route 100 from the edge of the Waitsfield Village historic district to the Fiddlers Green
Shopping Center and west and east of Route 100 from the Fayson-Waitsfield town line to the Mad River.
Irasville has developed into the town's commercial center over the last thirty years and although not
officially designated as a village center or growth center by the State yet, Waitsfield has considered Irasville
to be the town's principle village and growth area for over ten years5o. The Master Development Plan for
Irasville Growth Center states that Irasville, while not in the form of a traditional village center as Route 100
bisects it and makes it car-dependent, is "home to numerous retail and service oriented businesses, a
multitude of shops, restaurants and cafes, several inns, gas stations, professional services, grocery stores,
a theater, lumberyard, the local paper, the post office, and more" (5). According to the 2006 grand list5l,
27% of Irasville's acreage and 21% of its parcels included residential uses, 27% of the acreage and 45% of
parcels had some type of commercial use, and 13% of the acreage or 12% of parcels were considered
mixed-use. As per the 2002 master plan, these uses included 200,000 square feet of retail, office, and
manufacturing space, eighty housing units, including elderly and subsidized housing, and recreational
facilities. As of 2006, 13% of parcels and approximately 54 acres in Irasville were vacant while 9% of
parcels or 4% of the acreage was either not taxed or had no market value52.
In keeping with the growth centers concept discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, the town would
like to channel a majority of new development into Irasville over the coming twenty years, increasing the
50 The 2005 Town Plan calls for applying to the State for village and growth center designation, and the Town is currently working
towards that goal.
51 A grand list describes all properties in a town. The term is also used to denote 1% of the listed value of properties in a town.
52 The Town and a non-profit own the non-taxed parcels while common land makes up the properties with no market value.
density and vibrancy of the area. In fact, according to town officials, Irasville has the potential to
accommodate at least half of the town's new growth in the next two decades. At the same time, in planning
for Irasville, the town has found that several barriers exist to achieving its long-range vision of a compact
mixed-use village, including stormwater management, low-value wetlands, and zoning regulations.
However, as identified in the town plan, the aforementioned EPR study, and the Irasville master plan, the
greatest limiting factor to expanding the development potential of Irasville and concentrating high density
development there is a lack of municipal water and sewer facilities.
Waitsfield's Wastewater Project
For well over a decade, Waitsfield has known that it cannot continue to rely solely on individual and
clustered on-site systems to treat wastewater if it wishes to address health and environmental concems
and accommodate high density, mixed-use development in its growth centers. In fact, the 1993 town plan
cites the development of public sewer and water systems and zoning changes as the most critical steps in
implementing the growth center concept in Irasville, and a 1995 river management plan for the Mad River
cites water pollution as a major problem, due in part to failing on-site septic systems. In 1998, the town
received a Municipal Planning Grant from the State to evaluate the potential build-out in Irasville and
Waitsfield Village and to examine wastewater flows for those areas as a first step in developing a municipal
wastewater infrastructure implementation plan. In 1999, the town obtained a loan from the State to study
the feasibility of developing municipal wastewater facilities to serve Irasville and Waitsfield Village, and in
2000, the town purchased 12.2 acres south of Irasville as a disposal site. Since that time, the town, its
consulting engineers, and a Municipal Project Manager, have continued to plan for and design various
aspects of the project. However, it is important to note that while technical barriers have delayed progress
to some degree, the primary hurdle has been finding sufficient grant funds for the project, especially with
costs rising every time the estimated construction start date gets pushed back.
As of the writing of this thesis, the town is in the final design engineering stage and is faced with making a
decision on the scale of the project. One alternative would be to construct a collection system for Irasville
and Waitsfield Village, as well as a wastewater treatment plant with a 90,000 gallon per day (gpd) capacity
that could serve 245 equivalent residential users (ERUs), for an estimated project cost of over $12 million.
The second altemative is similar but would only service Irasville, providing capacity for 125 ERUs, and
would cost just over $10 million. The third alternative involves constructing a collection system for Irasville
only but would rely on the disposal site alone, with capacity of 20,000 gpd and serving 50 ERUs, for an
estimated project cost of approximately $5.5 million. The fourth alternative is essentially the same as the
third but relies on the granting of several property easements and would reduce construction costs by
nearly $500,000.
With either of the latter alternatives, the capacity of the system would only enable the town to address
existing systems that are underperforming in Irasville, allowing for minimal additional growth. It is important
to note that the town may end up needing to allocate all of the treatment capacity to existing buildings if, in
the course of construction, failing systems that were previously undetected are found. In spite of this, as
with any of the above alternatives, capacity for growth is intended to be maximized by creating a
management plan. Under such a plan, properties within Irasville that have functioning on-site systems and
are not likely to increase in density would keep their private systems but pay the town for oversight.
Furthermore, if the town chooses one of the smaller-scale options, the collection system would be put in
place in Irasville, so the town would have the option of building a treatment facility in the future to enable
increased capacity when there are funds to support such an upgrade.
At this time, it looks like the town is likely to pursue one of the latter two alternatives given current financial
constraints. According to a recent engineering document, the town anticipates using a combination of
STAG funds, pollution control grants, fees, and an increase in the municipal tax rate to cover the
approximately $5 million project costs. While the town has already secured congressional earmarks (STAG
funds) over the past few years totaling $2.5 million, the other sources are less assured. For instance, as
mentioned earlier in the thesis, the availability of pollution control grants is severely limited, and without
documented pollution Waitsfield ranks low on the State's priority list. In addition, while the town does seem
to support the project, bonding for the remainder requires resident approval to use general funds and fees
to repay the debt. Depending on what grants in addition to the STAG funds Waitsfield ends up being able
to acquire, the local share on the project will be in the range of $1 million to $3million, most likely financed
through a CWSRF loan. With the possibility of a bond vote in November 2007, and assuming a best case
scenario of it passing and of no delays in the permitting process, construction could begin during the
summer of 2008, would last between one and one and a half years, and service would be available
sometime during 2009. Of course, that is in the best of circumstances, so it is likely that the completion
date will actually be further in the future.
TIF in the Waitsfield Context
Waitsfield has shown interest in using TIF as source of revenue for infrastructure projects in Irasville for
some time now. In fact, the 2002 EPR study recommends that the town investigate the possibility of
establishing a TIF district encompassing Irasville to help pay for infrastructure development. TIF is
mentioned again in the 2002 Irasville master plan and also in the 2005 town plan as a way to achieve the
land use and development vision for the area without overly burdening existing property owners. The town
also set aside funds several years ago to hire a consultant to complete a TIF feasibility analysis, but when it
became clear that significant statutory changes were going to be made to Vermont's TIF legislation, the
town decided not to move forward with the study. Now, with the new TIF regulations in place, the town is
hoping to proceed with such analysis. Nevertheless, several technical and timing issues will prevent the
town from utilizing TIF for its wastewater project, at least in the first phase of the project.
As it appears that Waitsfield is going to pursue a smaller scale project than originally anticipated, there will
be very little treatment capacity available for new growth, especially if failing systems are identified during
construction. In addition, before conducting a TIF analysis, the town must finish rezoning Irasville to enable
the desired build-out, evaluate and address the other barriers to development mentioned in the master
plan, such as physical constraints and stormwater management, and apply for and receive approval for
growth center designation from the State, a process that is complicated and lengthy in and of itself.
Therefore, given that new development will be constrained by the scale of the first phase of the project and
given that the town would ideally like to start construction of this phase by summer 2008, it appears that
using TIF for this phase is not viable. However, these obstacles to using TIF for the first phase will
hopefully be overcome by the time the second phase is initiated, so it may be possible to use TIF to
partially fund the construction of a wastewater treatment plant that would expand the treatment capacity of
the initial system by 70,000 gpd in the second phase. At this time, the projected project cost for the
treatment plant, assuming construction starts within five years, is approximately $7 million, and the
consulting engineers anticipate that it can be paid for with a combination of grants, fees, and TIF.
Assuming that most of the increased capacity will not need to be allocated to existing buildings, it is
possible that the expansion could accommodate sufficient new growth to make TIF more viable than it is
currently. Therefore, a very preliminary feasibility analysis is warranted at this time so that Waitsfield can
decide if it wishes to engage in a more detailed analysis at a later date. However, it is important to
remember that under the current legislation, there is only a five-year window when TIF districts can be
approved. Therefore, even if it turns out that TIF is a viable option for Waitsfield for the second phase of its
wastewater project, its ability to make use of TIF also depends up on whether the legislature enables the
creation of TIF districts in Vermont beyond 2012.
Current Property Values and Tax Revenue in Irasville
As an initial step in a TIF feasibility analysis, the current conditions in a proposed district should be
examined to understand assessment and taxation practices, as well as to establish the frozen base used in
TIF calculations based on the existing current tax base and tax rate. In Vermont, all real property is
appraised at fair market value (or use value for farms and forests53) at the municipal level by listers. Based
on these appraisals, municipal and state (education) grand lists are produced for all towns annually,
describing the properties in each town. These grand lists are essentially the same, but might differ
depending on distinct exemptions or taxing policies at the local and state level. All entries in a grand list
show a property's listed value, as well as a figure representing 1% of the listed value, and so the term
grand list is also used to denote 1% of the listed value of properties in a town. Towns are only required to
conduct a full town-wide reappraisal when there is greater than a 20% spread between assessed value and
market value on properties in the town, as determined annually by the State54. In between such full
reappraisals, the only properties that are reappraised are those for which improvements or changes have
been made. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, in Vermont there are both municipal and state property
taxes, and for taxation purposes, all real property is classified as homestead or nonresidential• . A
municipal tax, which is set annually by a town's legislative body based on the assessed value of properties
and the town budget, is imposed on all properties regardless of their classification. The State sets the
homestead and nonresidential education tax rates for all towns each year according to a combination of
base rates and adjustments referred to as common level of appraisals and district spending adjustments56.
For the purpose of this analysis, the calculations for which can be found in Appendix C, I used the most
current tax rates, property value data from 2006 provided by one of the town's assessors, and Waitsfield's
53 Farm and forest property may be taxed according to its use value, but towns are reimbursed for the difference.
54The State conducts an annual equalization study and uses properties that have sold in that year to determine the difference in
sales price and assessed value in each town.
55 Any property that has not been declared a homestead is considered non-residential.
56 The base homestead rate is adjusted by both the common level of appraisal and the district spending adjustment while the
nonresidential base rate is adjusted by only the common level of appraisal. A district spending adjustment is made if residents in
a school district decide to spend more than the base education payment while a common level of appraisal is used to equalize
education taxes statewide to ensure that properties of equal value pay equal taxes since reappraisal takes place in different
years in all towns. For more information on how tax rates are determined, please refer to the Department of Taxes website at
http://www.state.vt.us/tax/pvr.shtml.
municipal and education grand lists from 2006. I should also note that a full reappraisal was conducted in
2006, so all figures are as close to market value as possible. For 2006, Waitsfield's municipal tax rate was
.29 per $100 of assessed value, and the education homestead and nonresidential tax rates were 1.119 and
1.1662, respectively. As per the 2006 figures, within Irasville all taxable property was listed at $32,651,448,
approximately 9% of the total value of all properties in Waitsfield. Of that, approximately 88% of the listed
value can be attributed to non-residential property. Non-taxable property, including property with no value
or that which is owned by the government or a non-profit entity, totaled $357,700, a mere 1% of all real
property in Irasville. In addition, it is important to note that two properties with affordable housing are taxed
for education purposes at a reduced listed value. In summary, municipal tax revenue from 2006 totaled
$94,997, education homestead revenue was $43,021, and education nonresidential revenue is $335,945.
Of course, these figures are approximations as there are always appraisal appeals and delinquent
taxpayers, but they are a good gauge of the existing tax base. Therefore, if a TIF district was activated in
2007, these figures would form the frozen base of $473,964 upon which all projected tax increments could
be calculated.
Predicting Future Tax Increments in Irasville & TIF Debt
Before projecting future tax increments that might be generated in a TIF district, it is important to examine
existing land use and market conditions to determine the potential that exists for future development. In
theory, Waitsfield is the type of small, rural community that might be able to use TIF, given its potential for
future development. As discussed earlier in this chapter, Waitsfield is the economic engine for the MRV,
has a fairly diverse economic base given its size and location as a tourist destination, and barring any
major unforeseen circumstances it is projected to see continued population, housing, and employment
growth in the next twenty years. It appears that the town is committed to creating the conditions under
which high-density, mixed-use development could be achieved by maintaining its aesthetic appeal and
addressing some of the regulatory, physical, and infrastructure barriers, albeit at a slow rate of progress
given staff and volunteer capacity. Within Waitsfield, Irasville is the best candidate for a TIF district as it is
the location where at least half of the new growth of the town should occur in the next twenty years. In
addition, it is the commercial center of the town and is currently dominated by nonresidential properties that
tend to command high values and to be taxed at a higher rate for education purposes than primary
residences. Also, within Irasville there is little acreage that currently has no value or is exempt from paying
taxes. Finally, not only is there 54 acres of vacant land in Irasville, but given the proposed zoning changes,
many of the existing improved properties can support more development.
At the same time, there are aspects of Irasville that may put the realization of projected tax increments at
risk. For instance, certain physical constraints of steep slopes and wetlands may prevent development on
some of the existing vacant land. In addition, although it is certainly necessary to maintain and attract a
quality workforce in Waitsfield, the town needs to be aware of the resulting impact of encouraging
affordable housing in Irasville on future tax increments, given its relatively lower values and partial
exemptions from education taxes. Also, the way tax rates are set at the municipal and state level leads to
uncertainty in projecting future tax increments, and while one consultant I interviewed stated that
projections based on current tax rates are considered the safest, it is important to factor in how close a
base year's tax rate is to a likely cyclical low, such as during a full reappraisal year. Related to this risk is
uncertainty as to when full reappraisals will occur and what the resulting base readjustment might be. For
instance, in the last twenty years, properties in the town as a whole were only reappraised twice, in 1996
and 2006. The 1996 reappraisal resulted in a 34% increase in the grand list over the previous year while
the reappraisal in 2006 resulted in a 104% increase over the previous year. According to one of
Waitsfield's listers, although towns like Waitsfield, where market value and assessed value have been
statistically different and triggered full reappraisal only once every ten years or so, given current market
conditions, this is likely to occur more like every five years in the future. Finally, given the existing
wastewater constraints, it is hard to pinpoint specific development that will occur in Irasville, and so the
actual timing of future development and how properties are assessed during the development process must
be considered. In addition, without specific development on the horizon, any projections based on a
generic build-out analysis need to err on the conservative side.
When I first envisioned this case study, I anticipated projecting future tax increments that might be
generated in Irasville to give the reader a sense of the portion of the second phase of Waitsfield's
wastewater project costs a TIF district might be able to cover. However, a combination of data and project
timing constraints has limited the reliability of any projections I can make. For example, the second phase
of Waitsfield's wastewater project is not slated to begin for at least five years and maybe longer, so using
2006 property value and tax data, as well as current phase two cost projections does not account for any
development, full reappraisals, or increases in cost projections that may occur in the meantime. In addition,
at this time, the best indication of future development is the build-out analysis that was created for the 2002
Irasville master plan. However, such growth projections are out of date, given that they were made
assuming status quo policies, and, for example, the proposed zoning changes that are likely to be
implemented in the near future will drastically alter such projections. In addition, in speaking with town staff
and officials, it appears that certain assumptions regarding vacancy rates that were included in those
projections are no longer accurate, and it is questionable as to how well land conditions, such as wetlands
and slopes, were accounted for in creating the projections. Also, the wastewater project details and the
potential that a considerable portion of any new treatment capacity will be allocated for existing buildings
has changed significantly in the last five years, so it is likewise questionable whether the projected growth
can actually be supported by the current version of the wastewater project, even after the second phase is
completed. Finally, the projections, especially those for residential units, are quite broads7, and there is no
indication of how such future development might be phased. Therefore, producing extensive tax increment
projections based on this data seems fairly futile at this time. On the other hand, a more cursory analysis
might be beneficial for highlighting issues Waitsfield will need to consider if it decides to move forward with
a more full-blown TIF feasibility study down the road once it completes a more current, realistic, and in-
depth build-out analysis.
As indicated by the grand lists from 1986 to 2006, listed property values in Waitsfield have grown from
$91,508,700 to $352,295,700 during that period. While this growth has certainly not occurred in a linear
fashion, annual property value growth rates average out to approximately 8.6% per year. As mentioned
earlier, during so called maintenance years, the only properties reappraised are those where improvements
have been made or property lines have been redrawn. In isolating the remaining eighteen maintenance
years from this period, the average annual property value growth rate drops to approximately 1.90/58.
While property value growth in those years does include normal market value appreciation, it is a better
gauge of property value growth due to improvements to properties, redevelopment, and new development
than the figure that includes the years in which a full reappraisal occurred. Furthermore, because a TIF
district base is only readjusted when more than 20% of properties in the town are reappraised, which tends
to occur only during town-wide reappraisals, a TIF district is likely to capture increments due to market
7 For example, the plan suggests that Irasville can anticipate between 120 and 230 new housing units in the next twenty years.
58 It is worth noting that from 1986-1996 this average was 1.96% while from 1996-2006 it was 1.88%, indicating that average
growth was not substantially different during those two ten-year periods.
appreciation during such maintenance years59. Thus, if we were to use historical trends alone in predicting
future development, the average annual property value growth rates during maintenance years of 1.9%
could be a good gauge. In addition, at least for Waitsfield as a whole, as per the 2002 EPR study it is
expected that population and job growth will progress at a similar or slightly lower rate than during the prior
ten years, and so new development in the town should similarly proceed at rates comparable to historic
trends. Of course, these assumptions are for the town as a whole and not Irasville in particular, where
property value growth may have occurred at a different average rate over the last twenty years and is likely
to accelerate at a faster pace once the new zoning is approved and the wastewater constraint is
addressed. However, a combination of a lack of electronic data, time constraints, and imprecise current
build-out projections prevented me from being able to isolate a historic average property value growth rate
for Irasville, as well as making precise projections of future property value growth in that area, so instead I
used the town-wide averages to make very 'back of the envelope' forecasts of future tax increments.
To make the 'back of the envelope' forecasts found in Appendix C, I used as a base year the 2006 listed
values for properties in Irasville. To project future property value growth, I used the maintenance year
historic average property value growth rate for Waitsfield of 1.9%, and I assumed that every five years
there would be a full reappraisal resulting in a 50% jump in listed values and a base readjustment to
account for such changes. I also used 2006 tax rates and assumed no change in the rate or change in the
composition of homestead and nonresidential tax payers during the life of the TIF district. In addition, I
assumed a best case scenario of the town being able to capture 100% of municipal increments and 75% of
state increments from the district to repay debt and a worst case scenario of capturing 75% of both
increments. Using these assumptions, I calculated that using 100% of municipal increments and 75% of
state increments, Irasville would generate from $7,199 in Year 1 to $1,828,756 in Year 20 that could be
used toward debt repayment. Under a scenario where only 75% of both increments could be captured for
debt repayment the Year 1 and Year 20 figures dropped to $6,750 and $1,786, 642, respectively.
Therefore, assuming that the town would obtain a CWSRF loan for twenty years with a 2% interest rate,
annual debt payments, and principal repayment deferred for five years, the projected stream of increments
could support a loan amount in the range of $2,501,687 to $2,546,710, depending on the percentage of
municipal and state increments that could be used for debt repayment. This approximately $2.5 million
s9 The multiplier used to readjust the base only accounts for the change in property values within the district between the year
prior to reappraisal and the year of reappraisal.
loan would thus cover about 35% of the projected project costs of $7 million, with the remainder having to
be covered with a combination of fees and grants. I should also point out that in the first five years, tax
increments will only be able to cover a small percentage of the interest payments, so the town would need
to establish a debt reserve fund to cover the shortfall. However, if such a fund is established using debt
proceeds, less of the debt can be used to cover the actual project costs. In addition, I have several words
of caution regarding the projected increments and TIF debt figures.
First, I used as initial base year figures the listed values from 2006 even though the project is not slated to
start for at least five years. Therefore, if I had a better sense of how property values had grown historically
in Irasville alone, I would have projected some modest growth over the next five years to create a more
realistic hypothetical base five years from now. Second, as discussed above, the method I used to project
future property growth is extremely imprecise give that it is based on historic property value growth for the
town as a whole. In addition to this average not being representative of Irasville alone, property value
growth does not occur in a linear fashion. In the case of Irasville, for example, there is probably pent-up
demand given a combination of wastewater and zoning constraints, and so there is likely to be greater
growth soon after sewer service is made available. At the same time, property values are not as great
during construction years, and the phasing of market rate and subsidized housing units and higher-value
commercial space will also affect the timing of property value growth spurts. Third, I inserted what seem to
be reasonable assumptions at this time regarding when full reappraisals might occur and the extent to
which they would bump up property values. However, given the current real estate market, it is hard to
know in what years a full reappraisal will actually occur and how much property values will rise in those
years. Fourth, the use of constant 2006 tax rates affects the accuracy of the projections. For instance, in
looking over the past twenty years, tax rates have tended to climb during maintenance years, dropping
significantly when a full town reappraisal occurs, and then steadily rising again after that. On the other
hand, while tax policies in Vermont have changed drastically in the past, total tax rates have averaged out
to 2.0219 per $100 of assessed value in the last twenty years. Therefore, using the 2006 figures, which are
lower than this average, has added some conservatism to the calculations. Fifth, although the homestead
and nonresidential tax rates only differ by approximately five cents per $100 of assessed value, it would be
best to account for possible changes in the homestead versus nonresidential makeup in the district. For
instance, with a good build-out analysis, it would be possible to predict how many residential units would
make a homestead declaration and thus garner homestead tax status. Essentially, all of these caveats
affect the likelihood of obtaining the debt amount projected because that figure is a mathematical result of
the terms of the debt and the lowest increment stream projected during the period when principle is repaid.
Therefore, if during a full-blown TIF analysis, it is determined that the Year 6 increment stream is higher or
lower than I projected, more or less debt can be obtained to cover project costs.
Conclusion
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, it does not seem reasonable for Waitsfield to consider using TIF for
the first phase of its wastewater project due to numerous technical, timing, and feasibility constraints.
However, TIF may be more plausible for the second phase of the project as the treatment facility that would
be constructed during that phase would add considerable capacity to the sewer system, and the town
should be better prepared to go through the process of creating a TIF district at that time. On the other
hand, even if the town determines that TIF is a reasonable option for partially paying for the second phase,
its ability to use TIF is then dependent upon the legislature enabling TIF district approvals beyond 2012.
Nevertheless, assuming that the State will allow new TIF districts to be created after 2012, it is
questionable as to whether it is worth the hassle of establishing a TIF district to help pay for the second
phase. As discussed in the previous chapter, preparing a TIF feasibility analysis and going through the
extensive process needed to establish a TIF district in Vermont is no easy task for a small town. At the
same time, as part of the process Waitsfield will go through to officially establish Irasville as a growth
center, it will have to prepare a detailed, up-to-date build-out analysis, and so some of the hurdles inherent
in conducting a TIF feasibility study will be mitigated. However, developing solid build-out projections is not
the only difficult aspect of creating a TIF district as discussed at length in this and the preceding chapter, so
Waitsfield will have to determine if it truly has the capacity to establish and manage a TIF district.
Not only does Waitsfield have to assess its ability to evaluate, create, and maintain a TIF district, but a
more precise TIF feasibility analysis would have to forecast a more confident and higher level of increments
than I projected in this chapter to warrant the extra work and costs of using this revenue-generating
mechanism as opposed to regular municipal or special district taxes. For instance, the very imprecise
'back of the envelope' projections I calculated indicate that a TIF district encompassing Irasville would only
support a loan of approximately $2.5 million, less than 35% of the current projected phase two project
costs. In addition, this assumes the use of a CWSRF loan, so if a loan was obtained from another source
at higher interest rates that debt figure would be lower. It is true that as compared to the share of costs
covered at the local level by municipal taxes and fees for recently completed wastewater projects, TIF
coverage of 35% is somewhat higher. However, given all the difficulties inherent in using TIF, it still seems
that although perhaps less politically feasible, Waitsfield would be better off using municipal taxes to
generate a similar level of revenue, especially since if new development does occur at the projected levels,
the expanded tax base will result in the tax rate allocated to the wastewater projects decreasing over time.
It is also important to remember that as the data from the prior chapter shows, as compared to the other
unsewered towns considering wastewater projects at this time, Waitsfield has to generate relatively little
new property value growth to obtain this level of TIF debt. Thus, for those other towns, an even lower
percentage of project costs would likely be covered by tax increments, at which point it really becomes
questionable as to why a town would even think of pursuing TIF. However, just because TIF may not be a
good option in the context of Waitsfield's wastewater project or projects in other unsewered towns that are
even less well positioned to make use of TIF, it does not necessarily follow that TIF is not viable for all
types of growth center infrastructure projects in the state. Furthermore, there are ways the State can
improve the financing process for growth center wastewater projects in unsewered towns other than
suggesting the use of TIF. Thus, in the following chapter I will bring this thesis to a close by discussing the
conclusions I have drawn from my thesis research, as well as recommending next steps Vermont can take
to better address the financing of growth center wastewater projects in its unsewered towns.
Chapter 6
CONCLUSION
In keeping with a long history of striving to preserve its traditional settlement pattern and promote smart
growth, Vermont's most recent growth management policies encourage municipalities to plan for and
accommodate development in dense, mixed-use growth centers. However, concentrating development in
this manner requires a level of wastewater treatment capacity that is absent in a majority of Vermont
municipalities and in nearly half of Vermont's existing designated village centers. It is certainly true that
wastewater treatment capacity is not the only nor the most critical barrier to implementing the growth center
concept in Vermont, but it is an obstacle that Vermont must address if it wishes to see its smart growth
goals fulfilled statewide, including in unsewered towns that are experiencing development pressure and
need to increase treatment capacity to accommodate such development in their growth centers.
The State is currently developing a publication and trainings to educate local decision-makers about
wastewater treatment problems and the range of possible conventional and alternative solutions. This
outreach effort will definitely help unsewered towns to better understand their wastewater treatment needs
and to find the most innovative and economical wastewater management solutions for their given situation.
However, sufficiently addressing the wastewater barrier to smart growth in Vermont also necessitates
tackling some of the difficulties inherent in financing these types of projects. Therefore, this thesis has
attempted to spark a discussion in Vermont about the financing side of this planning dilemma by providing
its readers with a better understanding of the funding realities of small community wastewater projects, as
well as the revenue-generating mechanism known as TIF, which has been proposed in Vermont as one
way to help towns fund their growth center wastewater infrastructure projects.
As discussed in chapter three, the wastewater infrastructure projects constructed in the last decade in
Vermont in previously unsewered towns were only made possible with significant govemment subsidies in
the form of federal and state grants and earmarks. Because debt levels were relatively low in these cases,
the towns were able, over time, to generate enough support to obtain approval to pay for the local share of
project costs with some form of tax revenue or fees. Conversely, several projects have stalled when towns
have been faced with needing to cover a greater share of project costs because similar levels of subsidies
have not been able to be obtained. One reason this happens relates to the fact that if a town decides to put
the burden of repayment of the local share of costs solely on the property owners who will directly benefit
from the wastewater infrastructure by charging an array of fees or levying a special tax on the service area,
there comes a point at which the cost per user is no longer affordable60. An altemative that towns
contemplate to generate more revenue to cover the local share of project costs involves using a
combination of fees and municipal tax revenue. However, the principle funding mechanism for municipal
budgets is property taxes, so in small, relatively rural communities with limited tax bases there tends to be
resistance to raising taxes, especially if the town has a substantial low-income population. In addition, state
property tax rates have a tendency to represent a majority of the total property tax rate, and so there is
even more pressure to keep municipal tax rates as low as possible. Given that sizeable levels of grant
funding are not likely to materialize in the near future and since some towns are unable or unwilling to cover
a high share of project costs using these traditional methods of debt repayment, Vermonters have been
looking for other ways to generate revenue at the local level. One idea that has surfaced in recent years is
the use of tax increment financing, the viability of which I began to explore in this thesis. Proponents
suggest that TIF would be a good fit for towns that plan on allocating a substantial portion of the treatment
capacity created through their wastewater projects to new growth because it does not burden the existing
tax base and it enables the town to divert state property tax revenue to help pay for the project. However,
the research from this thesis indicates that although using TIF is plausible in theory in this context, in
reality, employing TIF seems neither practical nor suitable for growth center wastewater projects in
unsewered towns.
In the first place, the argument that TIF will not burden the existing tax base is simply not true. For
instance, in Vermont, to obtain TIF debt, a town must provide a security pledge, so all property owners are
actually responsible for repayment. Yes, there are ways to reduce the likelihood of an increment shortfall
and the resulting need to use municipal tax revenue to meet debt obligations by making conservative
projections and establishing debt reserve funds. Nevertheless, the town is still on the hook, not to mention
the fact that these risk-mitigation measures add costs to the project. In addition, while the taxpayers at
large may not be paying for direct project costs, the existing tax base will be burdened indirectly as a result
of TIF. For example, since tax increments above the base are set aside to repay debt, any increased
service needs within the district or the community as a whole that would normally be paid for through
property taxes from the district must be covered by the rest of the town. The base readjustment
60 Wastewater fees are considered affordable if they are no more than 1.5% -2.5% of median income.
requirement does mitigate this burden to some degree, but it is still a factor to be considered. Finally, it is
important to note that if a town uses routine municipal tax revenue to help pay for a wastewater project as
opposed to TIF, it is not just the existing tax base that bears the burden of repayment if any of the treatment
capacity is allocated for future growth because it will be that expanded tax base that repays the debt.
Another reason that TIF does not seem fitting for a growth center wastewater project is that it is not
appropriate to shift the actual repayment of project debt entirely onto direct beneficiaries. As stated in the
previous paragraph, the community as a whole will bear some risk and burden from using TIF, but the
repayment of the investment under this financing mechanism is still predominantly focused on direct
beneficiaries. However, a growth center wastewater project by its very nature benefits more than just those
connected to the sewer service. Not only is water quality likely to improve, but as discussed at length in the
second chapter, all residents will benefit from development being able to occur in a growth center as
opposed to scattered throughout the community. Therefore, the town as a whole should contribute
financially to the wastewater project and not just the property owners receiving the sewer service.
In the context of a small, unsewered Vermont town, using TIF also does not seem very practical or viable
given the extensive process for establishing a TIF district as well as the market and taxation realities of
many of these types of towns. For instance, in most small, unsewered municipalities, town staff have little
time and capacity to work on projects requiring specialized knowledge, and even with the help of
consultants, project and planning decisions move slowly. Therefore, these types of towns will find it very
challenging to evaluate, create, and maintain a TIF district, not to mention that under the current statute,
TIF districts will only be approved in the next five years, so towns will have to act quickly to receive growth
center designation and TIF approvals. In addition, it seems that few unsewered towns have the conditions
under which a TIF district is likely to generate sufficient increments to meet necessary wastewater
infrastructure debt obligations. For instance, a cursory analysis of six unsewered communities in chapter
four indicates that to generate the level of incremental revenue needed to make debt payments on loans in
the range of $1 to $5 million would require considerable gains in a TIF district's grand list, so sizeable in
most cases that it is fairly implausible in those towns, especially for loans above $2 million.
Finally, using TIF in Vermont for any type of project has regional and state repercussions due to the use of
the state property tax revenue that is normally directed toward education throughout the state. Making use
of these funds is a key benefit of utilizing TIF in Vermont as it represents a revenue source that towns
cannot tap into otherwise. In addition, it could be argued that the benefits of a growth center wastewater
project will be experienced outside of the town itself, and so using this revenue source is reasonable.
However, the State is definitely conflicted on this issue as it has imposed a series of safeguards on the
diversion of education funds that actually makes evaluating the feasibility of using TIF and of obtaining TIF
debt much harder, including limiting the amount of state increments that can be used for debt repayment,
mandating that the percentage of municipal tax increments used meet or exceed the percentage of state
tax increments, stipulating a base readjustment, and restricting the number of TIFs in the next five years to
ten statewide and one per municipality. Therefore, one has to wonder if all these restrictions must be
imposed if it is really appropriate to even be using the state tax revenue for TIF purposes.
Given the above factors, the short answer to the question posed in my thesis title, Flushing Sprawl Down
the Drain: Is TIF an Option for Vermont Growth Center Wastewater Projects?, is probably not. The TIF
research and analysis I conducted for this thesis suggests that unsewered towns that have development
pressure may be able to generate some revenue from a TIF district to help pay for small percentage of
growth center wastewater project costs. On the other hand, compared to the cost and hassle associated
with using this financing tool in the context of a small unsewered Vermont town, the benefit of tapping into
state property tax revenue to cover only a small portion of project costs seems insignificant. At the same
time, I realize that my thesis does not take a comprehensive look at the viability of using TIF for this
purpose, and so more research and guidance is needed to help towns determine if it is worth conducting a
TIF feasibility analysis for their wastewater project. In addition, it is important to point out that although
formally making use of TIF may not be possible, the TIF concept can still be applied at the local level to
help pay for a wastewater project with routine municipal tax revenues. As mentioned earlier in this thesis,
TIF is built on the premise that a public investment, such as wastewater infrastructure, will not only increase
the value of existing properties in the service area, but it will also make land more attractive for new
development, thereby increasing the price of land and the amount of property taxes generated from those
properties. Given that municipal tax revenue is a function of property values and tax rates, the concept
behind TIF is still at play whether a town establishes a formal TIF district or not because municipal tax
revenue essentially captures the increased value that the wastewater infrastructure creates. Therefore,
although a town will not be able to tap into state property taxes, it can still access some of the benefits of
using TIF in a simpler and less costly manner by obtaining a general obligation bond to help pay for the
wastewater project.
Although generating local support for the notion of using municipal tax revenue to pay for a substantial
portion of a wastewater investment is easier said than done, the status quo approach to financing
wastewater projects in unsewered towns to address environmental concems and enable growth center
development is not sustainable. Given the federal government's long standing involvement in financing
wastewater infrastructure projects, it is no surprise that the federal government is blamed for many of the
difficulties unsewered towns face in funding their wastewater projects in light of grant program cuts and
decreasing capitalization of Vermont's CWSRF. However, there is little that can be done to alter the federal
government's funding priorities at this time. Therefore, if Vermont wishes to facilitate growth center
development in unsewered towns, it is going to have to focus on the aspects of the financing process that
are within the State's control, including keeping the local burden as low as possible, working with towns to
realize that a high cost at the local level must be incurred to tackle wastewater problems, and providing
assistance to towns to select the most practical, suitable, and equitable financing option.
One relatively easy fist step the State could take would be to evaluate and improve Vermont's current
approach to coordination of federal and state wastewater funding programs. As mentioned in chapter
three, according to a 2003 EPA publication entitled Handbook on Coordinating Funding for Water and
Wastewater Infrastructure, Vermont's approach to coordination in this regard is quite limited as compared
to other states. Thus, an improved coordination approach would likely ease the financing process for
unsewered towns by making searching for funding sources easier, reducing redundancies among grant and
loan applications, and improving the match between available funding sources and a project's specific
needs. Although it would require minimal funding, DEC and DHCA are already collaborating to educate
municipalities about wastewater management, and so these agencies could build upon that partnership to
later identify existing wastewater grant and loan sources as well as current formal and informal coordination
efforts, solicit stakeholder input for ways to improve the present approach, and craft a more extensive
coordination approach to federal and state wastewater funding for unsewered towns.
Another also relatively straightforward but perhaps less politically feasible issue within the State's purview
is to examine the impact of state and federal congressional earmarks for specific pet projects on the overall
availability of grant funds for wastewater projects in unsewered towns. The nature of politics is such that
the practice of earmarks is not likely fade away. However, it is still important for Vermont's state and
federal congressmen and senators to be aware of the imbalance between the needs of unsewered towns
and the number of projects that their earmarks assist. In addition, it is critical for them to realize that by
providing grant funds in this manner, a town has no incentive to design the most appropriate or economical
solution to their wastewater problems, a practice that counteracts other State efforts.
An additional funding issue the State can address relates to the Municipal Pollution Control Priority System,
which governs the allocation of the CWSRF loans and the State's pollution control grants. Although these
financial assistance programs are designed to help projects that reduce the level of pollution in state
waters, as programs of a state agency dedicated to natural resource conservation it seems odd that the
priority system does not evaluate a proposed project's smart growth benefits. Even though pollution control
grants and CWSRF loans may only be distributed to projects that serve growth centers, giving weight to
smart growth attributes by including a category in the ranking system related to smart growth would give
added support to the growth centers concept. In addition, given the environmental benefits of smart
growth, it seems unreasonable that towns that do not have any documented pollution but wish to construct
wastewater infrastructure to enable smart growth are ineligible for these funding sources. It is true that
Waitsfield was given special legislative approval to be listed, but without a category giving points for the
project's smart growth attributes, this approval holds little weight. Furthermore, if the legislature believed
that an exception should be made for Waitsfield, perhaps it should consider writing in a change in the
eligibility clause for all such projects.
If the State determines that pollution control is the most important factor in distributing the CWSRF loans
and pollution control grants, another way to improve capital availability for unsewered towns that are
looking to construct wastewater infrastructure in their growth centers is to establish a separate grant and/or
loan program for this explicit purpose. For instance, such programs could be structured so that unsewered
towns with officially designated growth centers and documented wastewater treatment constraints would be
entitled to a certain dollar amount or percentage of project costs according to a formula that makes the
allocation of funds equitable. Obviously, capitalizing such programs would require a very extensive and
costly process. On the other hand, the benefit would be that these types of projects would not compete
with the combined sewer overflow and phosphorous removal projects also eligible for the pollution control
grant program that are quite likely to rack up far more points in the pollution abatement categories. In
addition, such projects would not have to compete with all of the pollution control projects vying for CWSRF
loans, including projects that have received state funding in the past, something that will become much
more of an issue in the near future as the availability of CWSRF loans is constrained.
As indicated in chapter three, to date Vermont's CWSRF has always had more than enough funds to meet
municipal demand. However, due to several factors, the CWSRF faces an uncertain future. For instance,
the 2% interest rate on CWSRF loans is actually used to run the program, so there is no mechanism other
than repayment of principal and annual capitalization at the federal and state level to replenish the fund.
However, federal capitalization grants have steadily been decreasing over time, and the State has not
increased its match in an effort to allocate as much of the pollution control budget to the grant program. At
the same time, the demand for loan funds is on an upward swing, due to rising planning and construction
costs, growing interest in pollution control projects to address water quality issues and advance smart
growth, and the fact that several sewer systems across the state that were built several decades ago are
starting to need major upgrades. Therefore, if Vermont wishes to maintain this source of subsidized loan
funds for wastewater projects, it has to either contribute more than the required 20% annual match or re-
evaluate the existing interest rate structure. Of course, there are tradeoffs to both options. For instance, if
the State opts for the former and does not increase the overall pollution control budget, fewer grant funds
will be available for these types of projects. On the other hand, if the State decides to make the loan pool
more self-sustaining by altering the interest rate structure, it will not be as affordable for municipalities.
However, an interest rate structure could be designed to account for a town's ability to pay, or reduced
interest rates could be made available for projects in unsewered towns, for instance.
Although there are some ways the State can facilitate improved access to grants and loans for growth
center wastewater projects in unsewered towns, the reality is that the status quo approach to financing
these types of projects is not sustainable. At the same time, there are limits to shifting the burden of
payment onto the local level. Unfortunately, small towns are at a disadvantage as they grow and need
more resources but are constrained in their taxing powers to generate revenue for needed infrastructure
improvements. In addition, wastewater management projects that address water quality problems and
prevent sprawl have regional effects, and so there needs to be more research on ways to quantify such
widespread benefits and mechanisms for a more regional approach to paying for these kinds of projects.
Finally, it is important to point out that the process for financing any project in a small Vermont town is
difficult given capacity constraints at the local level, and so if the State wishes to address wastewater
problems in its unsewered towns, it must acknowledge and tackle this barrier. Fortunately, there are
already systems in place for providing technical assistance to communities, such as the regional planning
commissions and economic development corporations, state agencies, and the Vermont League of Cities
and Towns, and so a first step may be to identify what entities have the most specialized knowledge around
financing and can contribute their expertise to addressing these issues. In addition, the State is well
positioned to channel such information to towns through the wastewater management publications and
trainings it is currently developing, as long as it expands the scope of the current effort or builds upon this
effort in the future to assist unsewered communities in selecting the most practical, suitable, and equitable
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Appendix A
VERMONT SMART GROWTH POLICIES AND PROGRAMS, 1970 - 200661
1970 - Act 250
* Established ten criteria to guide regulatory review of large developments
1973 - Land Gains Tax
* Instituted a graduated tax on land sales profits to discourage short-term land speculation
1985 - Executive Order #15: State Buildings
* Required prioritization of locating state government activity in historic and other existing buildings
1987 - Vermont Housing and Conservation Board
* Created to provide grants and loans to non-profits, municipalities, and state agencies for land
conservation, historic preservation, and affordable housing
1988 - Act 200
* Set up mechanisms for increased coordination among municipal, regional, and state planning
efforts and a framework of twelve goals to guide these planning processes
1993 to 1995 - Growth Centers Pilot Project
* Initiated to test techniques, resources, and policy changes needed to plan for growth centers
1998 - Vermont Downtown.Program
* Established to provide assistance and incentives to communities for revitalizing their downtowns,
village centers, new town centers, and growth centers
2000 - Development Cabinet Law
* Instituted a mechanism for assuring collaboration among state agencies and departments in
balancing economic development and conservation interests
2001 - Executive Order #01-07: Interstate Interchanges
* Guided state agency decisions in planning for and responding to development proposed at
interstate interchanges
2002 - Agency of Natural Resources Wastewater Funding Rule
* Mandated that state funding may only be used for sewer expansions that serve growth centers
2006 - Act 183
* Called for the creation of a growth centers program and incentives to encourage development in
such areas
61 This list was compiled from information in the following reference sources: DeGrove, Dunkiel et al., and State of Vermont.
Appendix B
CHAPTER FOUR CALCULATIONS































Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $66,667 $66,667 $66,667 $66,667 $66,667
$20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $18,667 $17,333 $16,000 $14,667
$20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $20,000 $86,667 $85,333 $84,000 $82,667 $81,333
Year 11 Year 12 Year 13 Year 14 Year 15 Year 16 Year 17 Year 18 Year 19 Year 20
$66,667 $66,667 $66,667 $66,667 $66,667 $66,667 $66,667 $66,667 $66,667 $66,667
$13,333 $12,000 $10,667 $9,333 $8,000 $6,667 $5,333 $4,000 $2,667 $1,333
$80,000 $78,667 $77,333 $76,000 $74,667 $73,333 $72,000 $70,667 $69,333 $68,000
LOAN AMOUNT: $2 MILLION
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $133,333 $133,333 $133,333 $133,333 $133,333
$40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $37,333 $34,667 $32,000 $29,333
$40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $40,000 $173,333 $170,667 $168,000 $165,333 $162,667
Year 11 Year 12 Year 13 Year 14 Year 15 Year 16 Year17 Year18 Year19 Year 20
$133,333 $133,333 $133,333 $133,333 $133,333 $133,333 $133,333 $133,333 $133,333 $133,333
$26,667 $24,000 $21,333 $18,667 $16,000 $13,333 $10,667 $8,000 $5,333 $2,667
$160,000 $157,333 $154,667 $152,000 $149,333 $146,667 $144,000 $141,333 $138,667 $136,000
LOAN AMOUNT: $3 MILLION
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $200,000 $200,000 $200,000 $200,000 $200,000
$60,000 $60,000 $60,000 $60,000 $60,000 $60,000 $56,000 $52,000 $48,000 $44,000
$60,000 $60,000 $60,000 $60,000 $60,000 $260,000 $256,000 $252,000 $248,000 $244,000
Year 11 Year 12 Year 13 Year 14 Year 15 Year 16 Year 17 Year 18 Year 19 Year 20
$200,000 $200,000 $200,000 $200,000 $200,000 $200,000 $200,000 $200,000 $200,000 $200,000
$40,000 $36,000 $32,000 $28,000 $24,000 $20,000 $16,000 $12,000 $8,000 $4,000
$240,000 $236,000 $232,000 $228,000 $224,000 $220,000 $216,000 $212,000 $208,000 $204,000
LOAN AMOUNT: $4 MILLION
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9. Year 10
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $266,667 $266,667 $266,667 $266,667 $266,667
$80,000 $80,000 $80,000 $80,000 $80,000 $80,000 $74,667 $69,333 $64,000 $58,667
$80,000 $80,000 $80,000 $80,000 $80,000 $346,667 $341,333 $336,000 $330,667 $325,333
Year 11 Year 12 Year 13 Year 14 Year 15 Year 16 Year 17 Year 18 Year 19 Year 20
$266,667 $266,667 $266,667 $266,667 $266,667 $266,667 $266,667 $266,667 $266,667 $266,667
$53,333 $48,000 $42,667 $37,333 $32,000 $26,667 $21,333 $16,000 $10,667 $5,333
$320,000 $314,667 $309,333 $304,000 $298,667 $293,333 $288,000 $282,667 $277,333 $272,000
LOAN AMOUNT: $5 MILLION
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
$0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $333,333 $333,333 $333,333 $333,333 $333,333
$100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $93,333 $86,667 $80,000 $73,333
$100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $100,000 $433,333 $426,667 $420,000 $413,333 $406,667
Year 11 Year 12 Year13 Year 14 Year 15 Year 16 Year 17 Year 18 Year 19 Year20
$333,333 $333,333 $333,333 $333,333 $333,333 $333,333 $333,333 $333,333 $333,333 $333,33=
$66,667 $60,000 $53,333 $46,667 $40,000 $33,333 $26,667 $20,000 $13,333 $6,667
$400,000 $393,333 $386,667 $380,000 $373,333 $366,667 $360,000 $353,333 $346,667 $340,00(
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Muni Tax Muni Tax HS Tax NR Tax Tax Total Tax
Tax Map # HS Value NR Value Rate Revenue HS Tax Rate Revenue NR Tax Rate Revenue Revenue Revenue
38009 $287,800 0.0029 $835 0.01119 $3,220 0.011662 $0 $3,220 $4,055
38002 $315,600 0.0029 $915 0.01119 $3,532 0.011662 $0 $3,532 $4,447
29002 $255,900 0.0029 $742 0.01119 $2,864 0.011662 $0 $2,864 $3,606
29001 $138,500 0.0029 $402 0.01119 $1,550 0.011662 $0 $1,550 $1,951
38005 $163,000 0.0029 $473 0.01119 $1,824 0.011662 $0 $1,824 $2,297
99140 $321,400 0.0029 $932 0.01119 $3,596 0.011662 $0 $3,596 $4,529
99128 $446,600 0.0029 $1,295 0.01119 $4,997 0.011662 $0 $4,997 $6,293
99130.1 $377,000 0.0029 $1,093 0.01119 $4,219 0.011662 $0 $4,219 $5,312
38003 $229,300 $57,400 0.0029 $831 0.01119 $2,566 0.011662 $669 $3,235 $4,067
99130 $252,400 $146,000 0.0029 $1,155 0.01119 $2,824 0.011662 $1,703 $4,527 $5,682
99183 $295,800 $89,900 0.0029 $1,119 0.01119 $3,310 0.011662 $1,048 $4,358 $5,477
99127 $395,500 $180,800 0.0029 $1,671 0.01119 $4,426 0.011662 $2,108 $6,534 $8,205
99138 $193,100 $762,800 0.0029 $2,772 0.01119 $2,161 0.011662 $8,896 $11,057 $13,829
99143 $172,700 $66,100 0.0029 $693 0.01119 $1,933 0.011662 $771 $2,703 $3,396
99153 $60,300 0.0029 $175 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $703 $703 $878
23001 $53,400 0.0029 $155 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $623 $623 $778
99124 $80,200 0.0029 $233 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $935 $935 $1,168
99129 $68,700 0.0029 $199 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $801 $801 $1,000
99125 $198,000 0.0029 $574 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $2,309 $2,309 $2,883
23002 $74,300 0.0029 $215 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $866 $866 $1,082
23004 $35,700 0.0029 $104 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $416 $416 $520
99146 $140,300 0.0029 $407 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $1,636 $1,636 $2,043
99157 $36,000 0.0029 $104 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $420 $420 $524
29003.6 $65,000 0.0029 $189 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $758 $758 $947
29001.5 $95,000 0.0029 $276 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $1,108 $1,108 $1,383
99158.002 $168,900 0.0029 $490 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $1,970 $1,970 $2,460
99158.001 $205,100 0.0029 $595 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $2,392 $2,392 $2,987
38006 $257,900 0.0029 $748 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $3,008 $3,008 $3,756
99163 $445,000 0.0029 $1,291 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $5,190 $5,190 $6,480
99156 $355,700 0.0029 $1,032 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $4,148 $4,148 $5,180
38008 $864,320 0.0029 $2,792 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $10,080 $10,080 $12,872
99159 $279,528 0.0029 $833 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $3,260 $3,260 $4,093
99169 $749,800 0.0029 $2,174 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $8,744 $8,744 $10,919
99141 $383,900 0.0029 $1,113 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $4,477 $4,477 $5,590
99170 $272,600 0.0029 $791 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $3,179 $3,179 $3,970
38001 $314,600 0.0029 $912 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $3,669 $3,669 $4,581
99166 $350,800 0.0029 $1,017 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $4,091 $4,091 $5,108
99177 $327,500 0.0029 $950 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $3,819 $3,819 $4,769
99176 $290,800 0.0029 $843 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $3,391 $3,391 $4,235
99172 $250,300 0.0029 $726 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $2,919 $2,919 $3,645
99160 $631,000 0.0029 $1,830 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $7,359 $7,359 $9,189
99123 $545,000 0.0029 $1,581 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $6,356 $6,356 $7,936
99136.008 $173,000 0.0029 $502 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $2,018 $2,018 $2,519
99136.007 $144,700 0.0029 $420 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $1,687 $1,687 $2,107
99136.005 $108,100 0.0029 $313 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $1,261 $1,261 $1,574
99136.004 $108,900 0.0029 $316 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $1,270 $1,270 $1,586
99136.003 $150,700 0.0029 $437 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $1,757 $1,757 $2,194
99136.002 $134,200 0.0029 $389 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $1,565 $1,565 $1,954
99136.001 $137,400 0.0029 $398 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $1,602 $1,602 $2,001
99148 $1,000,400 0.0029 $2,901 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $11,667 $11,667 $14,568
99133 $979,200 0.0029 $2,840 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $11,419 $11,419 $14,259





Muni Tax Muni Tax HS Tax HS Tax NR Tax NR Tax Tax Total Tax
Tax Map # HS Value NR Value Rate Revenue Rate Revenue Rate Revenue Revenue Revenue
99152 $3,395,000 0.0029 $9,846 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $39,592 $39,592 $49,438
99131 $1,757,700 0.0029 $5,097 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $20,498 $20,498 $25,596
99167.1 $18,600 0.0029 $54 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $217 $217 $271
99139 $550,400 0.0029 $1,596 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $6,419 $6,419 $8,015
99173 $710,900 0.0029 $2,062 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $8,291 $8,291 $10,352
99172.1 $212,000 0.0029 $615 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $2,472 $2,472 $3,087
99171 $260,000 0.0029 $754 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $3,032 $3,032 $3,786
23001.1 $345,100 0.0029 $1,001 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $4,025 $4,025 $5,025
99132 $296,300 0.0029 $859 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $3,455 $3,455 $4,315
23005 $957,200 0.0029 $2,776 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $11,163 $11,163 $13,939
99175 $301,000 0.0029 $873 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $3,510 $3,510 $4,383
99147 $1,017,700 0.0029 $2,951 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $11,868 $11,868 $14,820
99167 $157,000 0.0029 $455 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $1,831 $1,831 $2,286
99164 $705,400 0.0029 $2,046 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $8,226 $8,226 $10,272
99161 $410,000 0.0029 $1,189 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $4,781 $4,781 $5,970
23003 $1,004,100 0.0029 $2,912 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $11,710 $11,710 $14,622
99145 $504,700 0.0029 $1,464 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $5,886 $5,886 $7,349
99121 $334,800 0.0029 $971 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $3,904 $3,904 $4,875
99183.2 $186,100 0.0029 $540 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $2,170 $2,170 $2,710
99165 $356,800 0.0029 $1,035 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $4,161 $4,161 $5,196
99144 $526,800 0.0029 $1,528 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $6,144 $6,144 $7,671
23001.2 $519,200 0.0029 $1,506 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $6,055 $6,055 $7,561
99120 $652,100 0.0029 $1,891 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $7,605 $7,605 $9,496
99178 $224,600 0.0029 $651 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $2,619 $2,619 $3,271
99149 $714,600 0.0029 $2,072 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $8,334 $8,334 $10,406
99142 $738,900 0.0029 $2,143 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $8,617 $8,617 $10,760
99136.006 $142,700 NOT TAXED $0 NOT TAXED $0 NOT TAXED $0 $0 $0
99122 $96,000 NOT TAXED $0 NOT TAXED $0 NOT TAXED $0 $0 $0
99158 $0 0.0029 $0 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $0 $0 $0
99136 $0 0.0029 $0 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $0 $0 $0
38004 $0 0.0029 $0 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $0 $0 $0
99180 $0 0.0029 $0 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $0 $0 $0
99181 $0 0.0029 $0 0.01119 $0 0.011662 $0 $0 $0
99135 $119,000 NOT TAXED $0 NOT TAXED $0 NOT TAXED $0 $0 $0
TOTALS $3,844,600 $29,164,548 $94,997 $43,021 $335,945 $378,967 $473,964
Total NR Taxable $28,806,848
Total Taxable Value $32,651,448
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